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PROSECUTORS, ETHICS, AND
EXPERT WITNESSES
Paul C. Giannelli* & Kevin C. McMunigal**
If the prosecution theory was that death was caused by a Martian death
ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann reported.1

INTRODUCTION
Some of the most disturbing revelations that emerged from the DNA
exonerations that occurred in the 1990s concern the misconduct of
prosecutors. In Actual Innocence,2 Barry Scheck and his colleagues
examined sixty-two of the first sixty-seven DNA exonerations secured
through Cardozo Law School’s Innocence Project in order to ascertain what
factors contributed to erroneous convictions. Prosecutorial misbehavior
was found in forty-two percent of the cases.3 Another significant
contributor to these miscarriages of justice was the misuse of expert
testimony. A third of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science.”4
* Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University.
** Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil: Discovery of Possibly
Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 24, 24
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va.
J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 439 (1997) (discussing expert misconduct, including Dr. Ralph Erdmann’s
cases); see also Roy Bragg, New Clues May Be Dug from Grave; Furor Touches on
Autopsies, Brains, Houston Chron., Mar. 28, 1992, at 1A (“[C]all him ‘McErdmann,’ . . . .
He’s like McDonald’s—billions served.’” (quoting Dallam County District Attorney Barry
Blackwell)); Chip Brown, Pathologist Accused of Falsifying Autopsies, Botching Trial
Evidence, L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 1992, at A24 (“[F]ormer Dallas County assistant medical
examiner Linda Norton was quoted as saying [Dr.] Erdmann routinely performs ‘made-toorder autopsies that support a police version of a story.’”).
2. Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other
Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 246 (2000). As of September 2007, there have
been over 205 DNA exonerations. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2008).
3. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 246. The conduct of defense attorneys was also
found to be less than exemplary. See infra text accompanying notes 229–32.
4. Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 246. A subsequent review attributed 63% of the
wrongful convictions to forensic science testing errors and 27% to false or misleading
testimony by forensic experts. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, Review, The
Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 Sci. 892, 892 fig.1 (2005). A
2005 study identified 24 prosecutions in which forensic scientists committed perjury. Samuel
R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 523, 543 (2005). This study identified 340 exonerations, 196 of which did not
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This essay examines the intersection of these two factors—the prosecutor’s
role in using and presenting expert testimony, a topic that is being
addressed with increasing frequency by commentators.5 The prosecutor’s
suppression of exculpatory DNA test results in the Duke lacrosse case is but
one recent illustration of this problem.6
The prosecutorial misconduct revealed in the exoneration cases, however,
is not a new phenomenon. Older cases reveal similar misconduct,
suggesting that the problem is systemic rather than episodic. Prosecutorial
misconduct in the use of scientific evidence is significant because of the
increasingly important role that scientific evidence plays in the criminal
justice system. One study found that approximately “one quarter of the
citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have
changed their verdicts—from guilty to not guilty.”7 This research was
published before the use of DNA evidence became widespread8 and prior to
involve DNA evidence. Id. at 524. The most recent study of 200 DNA exonerations found
that expert testimony (present in 55% of the cases) was the second leading type of evidence
(after eyewitness identifications, 79% of cases) used in the wrongful conviction cases.
Garrett, supra note 2.
5. A number of commentators examine the issue. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman,
Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 17, 17 (2003) (“The
prosecutor’s misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict has not been sufficiently
examined.”); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of
Justice, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2007) (“To date, the legal system and commentators have
paid little attention to prosecutorial discretion in the use of unreliable expert testimony—
despite mounting evidence that misconvictions have been based upon unreliable expert
testimony.”); Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys,
49 Clev. St. L. Rev. 421, 421 (2001) (“What are the legal and ethical responsibilities of
attorneys when offering scientific expert evidence to courts?” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Some commentators have considered the ethical issues that arise in the use of experts in
civil litigation. See Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 465, 466 (1999); Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev.
1539 (2007); Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science—The Lawyer’s Ethical Responsibilities, 25
Fordham Urb. L.J. 449 (1998); Justin P. Murphy, Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where
Are the Ethics?, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217 (2000).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 117–18.
7. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the
Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. Forensic Sci. 1730, 1748 (1987); see also Scott Bales,
Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, Litig., Winter 2000, at 51, 51
(commenting that “prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges agree that scientific evidence
can powerfully affect—and often determine—the outcome in criminal cases”).
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote, “Scientific issues permeate the law. Criminal courts
consider the scientific validity of, say, DNA sampling or voice prints, or expert predictions
of defendants’ ‘future dangerousness,’ which can lead courts or juries to authorize or
withhold the punishment of death.” Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, Issues in Sci.
& Tech., Summer 2000, at 52, 53. According to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, “Hardly a case of
importance is tried today in the federal courts without the involvement of a number of expert
witnesses.” Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 473
(1986).
8. In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester, England, recognized the
utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases. Its first use in American courts came the
following year. See Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Congress, Genetic Witness: Forensic
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the avalanche of television programs on forensic science creating what has
come to be known as the “CSI effect.”9
Once a prosecutor determines to employ an expert, a number of distinct
decisions must be confronted—from choosing the expert, to complying
with discovery obligations, to presenting the testimony at trial. Part I of this
essay considers the selection of experts. Although improper selection of
experts can be viewed as merely another aspect of presenting misleading
testimony, we treat it separately in this essay because the literature typically
ignores it. Part II examines the pretrial disclosure of scientific evidence.
The issues that have arisen in this context include late disclosure, omitting
information from laboratory reports, declining to have a report prepared,
and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Part III explores a number of
ways in which prosecutors have presented expert testimony in a misleading
manner. What practices should be considered “misleading” is far from
obvious. In Part IV, we take a broader view and consider reforms that have
relevance across a range of issues.
I. EXPERT SELECTION
At times, prosecutors are not involved in choosing expert witnesses. In a
routine drug case, for example, the police may submit a substance suspected
of containing cocaine for testing by a chemist employed by the police
without any notification to or input from the prosecutor who may eventually
try the case. However, if the results of scientific testing are likely to be
contested, the prosecutor may become quite involved and exercise
considerable power and control in the selection of an expert witness. Such
power may be exercised appropriately. For example, if fingerprints are a
critical piece of evidence, a prosecutor might seek to obtain the most
competent expert available. But such power may also be exercised
inappropriately by seeking out an expert based on the expert’s willingness
to support the prosecution’s theory of the case regardless of the soundness
of the expert’s view. This latter practice, which we refer to as “shopping”
for an expert, can result in the presentation of misleading evidence to a jury.
A. Louise Robbins
One of the U.S. Supreme Court’s prosecutorial immunity cases, Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons,10 offers an illustration of how testimony can be skewed by
Uses of DNA Tests 8 (1990) [hereinafter OTA Report]. The first appellate case, was
reported in 1988. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
DNA evidence admissible). By January 1990, forensic DNA analysis had been admitted
into evidence “in at least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military.” OTA Report, supra,
at 14.
9. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing
Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 Yale L.J. 1050 (2006) (noting the uncertainty
of the phenomenon); Michael Mann, Comment, The “CSI Effect”: Better Jurors Through
Television and Science?, 24 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 211 (2006).
10. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
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the selection process. In 1983, Stephen Buckley, along with Rolando Cruz
and Alejandro Hernandez, was indicted for a highly publicized Illinois
murder. The critical evidence was a boot print left by the killer on the door
of the eleven-year-old victim’s home when the killer kicked it in.11 Experts
from the county and state crime labs, as well as from the Kansas Bureau of
Identification, were unable to identify Buckley’s boot as the source of the
print.12 Ignoring these government experts, prosecutors shopped for a
“positive identification” from Dr. Louise Robbins, a controversial expert.13
A detective, who resigned because he believed the wrong people had
been charged, stated it this way,
The first lab guy says it’s not the boot . . . . We don’t like that answer, so
there’s no paper [report]. We go to a second guy who used to do our lab.
He says yes. So we write a report on Mr. Yes. Then Louise Robbins
arrives. This is the boot, she says. That’ll be $10,000. So now we have
evidence.14

Buckley’s trial ended in a hung jury. His codefendants, however, were
convicted but later freed due to DNA analysis.15 Indeed, an appellate
prosecutor, like the detective mentioned earlier, resigned in protest,16 and
the district attorneys were subsequently tried (but acquitted) for their
conduct in prosecuting the codefendants.17 DNA evidence later exonerated
Buckley.18
11. Id. at 262.
12. See id. (“After three separate studies by experts from the Du Page County Crime
Lab, the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, and the Kansas Bureau of Identification,
all of whom were unable to make a reliable connection between the print and a pair of boots
that petitioner had voluntarily supplied, respondents obtained a ‘positive identification’ from
one Louise Robbins, an anthropologist in North Carolina who was allegedly well known for
her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony.”).
13. See id. at 272 (holding that “prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for the
claim that they conspired to manufacture false evidence that would link [Buckley’s] boot
with the bootprint the murderer left on the front door. To obtain this false evidence,
petitioner submits, the prosecutors shopped for experts until they found one who would
provide the opinion they sought.”); Giannelli, supra note 1, at 457–58 (discussing Robbins).
14. Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty: An Illinois Murder Case Became a Test of
Conscience Inside the System, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1992, (Magazine), at 19 (quoting former
detective John Sam).
15. Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in
the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial 44–46 (1996) (discussing the
cases of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez).
16. Siegel, supra note 14, at 19 (discussing the resignation of attorney Mary Brigid
Kenney).
17. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 176–80; see also Pam Belluck, Officials Face
Trial in an Alleged Plot to Frame a Man for Murder, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1999, at A19 (“In
a case being closely watched by lawyers and investigators, a group of seven prosecutors and
sheriff’s deputies will go on trial on Tuesday, charged with conspiring to frame an innocent
man.”); Eric Herman, Conspiracy Theory, Am. Law., Mar. 1998, at 75 (discussing the
prosecution of the prosecutors and police officers involved in the alleged conspiracy before
their trial).
18. See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 644 (Ill. 1994) (“Seminal fluid recovered from
the victim’s body was DNA tested, excluding both of defendant’s previous codefendants
Alex Hernandez and Steven Buckley as possible sources, but not defendant or Brian Dugan,
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When experts disagree, at what point is the prosecutor on notice that a
serious problem might exist, thereby triggering an obligation to investigate
further? What if an expert always says what the prosecutor wants to hear?
Such questions were particularly relevant in the Buckley case; Robbins was
at the center of controversy prior to being retained.19 As her moniker, the
“Cinderella” expert, suggests, she claimed abilities that no one else had.20
That alone should have given the prosecutor pause—especially after
three other government experts could not support her conclusion.
Moreover, the prosecutor announced Buckley’s indictment shortly before a
tightly contested primary election.
B. Fred Zain
In West Virginia, the former head serologist of the state police crime
laboratory, Trooper Fred Zain, falsified test results in as many as 133 cases
from 1979 to 1989.21 A team of outside forensic scientists found that
“when in doubt, Zain’s findings would always inculpate the suspect.”22
After Zain accepted a position in the San Antonio crime lab, West Virginia
prosecutors sent evidence to him for retesting because the West Virginia
serologists apparently could not reach the “right” results. For example, one
serologist “testified that at least twice after Zain left the lab, evidence on
which [the serologist] had been unable to obtain genetic markers was
subsequently sent to Texas for testing by Zain, who again was able to
identify genetic markers.”23 His replacement as director of serology would
an individual convicted of several other sexual assaults and murders of young females, who
indicated he alone killed Jeanine Nicarico.”).
19. See Thomas Frisbie, Prosecution Tactics Drew Critics from the Beginning, Chi. SunTimes, Nov. 5, 1995, at 24 (“[P]rosecutors used the testimony of Louise Robbins, who used
a scientifically unverified method of matching shoeprints to shoes through a ‘wear pattern.’
Robbins said her method showed Buckley kicked in the [victim’s] front door, even though
the pattern on the bottom of Buckley’s shoes differed from the one on the door.”).
20. See People v. Puluti, 174 Cal. Rptr. 597, 603 (Ct. App. 1981) (Robbins “had never
before been qualified as an expert to testify about foot imprints left inside of shoes for
purposes of identification” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Barker, 170 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct.
App. 1980) (“She considered herself the chief proponent of the ‘unique shoeprint’ concept,
in that she was the only person presently working on this subject.”); Mark Hansen, Believe It
or Not, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64, 65 (“But Robbins was alone in claiming that she could
tell whether a person made a particular print by examining any other shoes belonging to that
individual.”); Vicki Quade, If the Shoe Fits: Footprint Expert Testifies, A.B.A. J., July
1984, at 34, 34 (“By analyzing the soles of a shoe, . . . she can determine whether a specific
person wore the shoes, based on impressions and wear patterns made by the bones of the
foot.”).
21. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 510 & n.4 (W. Va. 1993).
22. Id. at 512 n.9. The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors provided the
team. Id.
23. Id. at 512. Other examiners had similar experiences. “[Serologist Howard Brent]
Myers also testified that after he had been unable to find blood on a murder suspect’s jacket,
it was sent to Texas, where [Fred] Zain found a bloodstain which tested consistent with the
blood of the victim.” Id. According to Zain’s replacement, “several prosecutors expressed
dissatisfaction with the reports they were receiving from serology and specifically requested
that the evidence be analyzed by Zain.” Id. at 512 n.16.
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later describe Zain as “very pro-prosecution.”24 Apparently, no prosecutor
ever questioned Zain’s methods or results during his “long history of
falsifying evidence in criminal prosecutions.”25 In a 60 Minutes interview,
a prosecutor excused his colleagues by saying that they thought that they
had a “world class” expert.26 Why prosecutors would believe that Zain, but
not his coworkers, was a “world class” expert is not clear. Sending
evidence to Zain in Texas after receiving results that did not support their
case belies the notion that these prosecutors did not have notice of the
problem.
C. Joyce Gilchrist
Joyce Gilchrist, a forensic chemist in the Oklahoma City Police
Department crime laboratory, provides another illustration of prosecutors
recklessly or knowingly selecting a corrupt expert.27 Gilchrist started
working for the lab in 1980. It was not long before she became enmeshed
in controversy. An expert from another government lab filed an ethics
complaint against her with the Southwestern Association of Forensic
Scientists, which conducted an investigation and concluded that Gilchrist
had failed to distinguish between her personal and scientific opinions.28
In 1988, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, reversing a criminal
conviction, found that Gilchrist had “inexcusabl[y]” delayed sending her
laboratory report as well as an evidence sample to a defense expert.29 The

24. Id. at 514 n.23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. at 503.
26. 60 Minutes: Right On, Fred Zain (CBS television broadcast Apr. 24, 1994).
27. See Mark Fuhrman, Death and Justice: An Exposé of Oklahoma’s Death Row
Machine 232 (2003) (“[Joyce Gilchrist] appears to have used her lab tests to confirm the
detectives’ hunches rather than seek independent scientific results. She also tried to control
the results of her tests . . . . She treated discovery requests with contempt and kept evidence
from the defense. She systematically destroyed evidence at the very time when she knew
that much of that evidence might be retested.”).
28. See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). In that case,
the court observed,
. . . [O]n December 14, 1987, Max Courtney, President of the Southwestern
Association of Forensic Scientists, Inc., issued a prepared statement of the Board
of Directors concerning allegations of professional misconduct lodged against Ms.
Gilchrist. A certified copy of this statement, which was filed with this Court on
January 4, 1988, concluded that Ms. Gilchrist had violated the ethical code, but
interestingly she was not disciplined. That statement reads in relevant part: “Our
Professional Conduct Committee thoroughly investigated the allegations against
Ms. Joyce Gilchrist and . . . communicated with [her] that she should distinguish
personal opinion from opinions based upon facts derived from scientific
evaluation . . . . We further conclude that, in our system of jurisprudence, undue
pressure can be placed upon the forensic scientist to offer personal opinions
beyond the scope of scientific capabilities.”
Id.
29. Id. at 1217 (“Ms. Gilchrist’s delay and neglect in not completing her forensic
examination and report . . . was inexcusable, since she began her forensic examination in
December of 1982.”). In subsequent litigation, the court wrote, “[F]ollowing our decision in
Petitioner’s first trial, it can be safely said that the entire legal community was on notice that
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court also criticized Gilchrist for omitting critical information from the
report, labeling her conduct “trial by ambush.”30 Finally, the same court
found that Gilchrist had testified beyond the state of the art.31 A year later,
the court questioned her testimony concerning hair analysis in Fox v.
State,32 a death penalty case, finding that she had overstated her conclusions
at trial.33
The following year, in Pierce v. State,34 the court addressed Gilchrist’s
conduct one more time. Here, again, she violated a court discovery order
by failing to turn over evidence to the defense and wrote an incomplete
report.35 As before, the court used forceful language: “Instead of following
either the letter of the Order or taking steps to have the Order changed or
clarified by the court, she took it upon herself to determine the portions of
the Order with which she wished to comply. This was not her decision to
make.”36 Although the conviction was upheld, Pierce was later exonerated
by DNA37 and sued Gilchrist for violating his constitutional rights.38
this Court was not particularly impressed with Ms. Gilchrist’s hair comparison techniques
and unscientific opinions in relation to Petitioner.” McCarty v. State, 114 P.3d 1089, 1093
(Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
30. McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1218 (“[T]he forensic report was at best incomplete, and at
worst inaccurate and misleading. . . . Gilchrist admitted at trial, however, that she failed to
include her conclusion . . . in the forensic report given to Mr. Wilson. This significant
omission, whether intentional or inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
31. Id. (“We find it inconceivable why Ms. Gilchrist would give such an improper
opinion, which she admitted she was not qualified to give.”).
32. 779 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (upholding a murder conviction and the death
penalty).
33. See id. at 571 (“The lack of scientific weight of such a conclusion is apparent on
reflection by those dealing with similar evidence on a regular basis. But to a lay jury,
usually ill-equipped to assimilate hair analysis findings on their own, such an opinion may
appear too substantial.”); id. (“Ms. Gilchrist admitted that an individual could not be
positively identified by hair evidence. However, she went on to testify that, ‘[in] her
opinion . . . Mark Fowler and Bill Fox were in contact with John Barrier prior to death.’”).
34. 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
35. Id. at 1263 n.8 (“Specifically, Appellant claims that it was error for Gilchrist not to
set out in the report, her opinion that the attacker was a non-secretor.”). At trial, Gilchrist
testified that Jeffrey Todd Pierce was a nonsecretor, a person whose blood type cannot be
determined through other body fluids, including semen. Twenty percent of the population
falls into this category. 1 Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence §
17.09, at 959 (4th ed. 2007).
36. Id. at 1261.
37. A later Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) examination of Gilchrist’s analyses in
eight cases determined that she had misidentified hairs in six and fibers in another. See FBI,
Summary of Case Reviews of Forensic Chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, Oklahoma City Police
Department Crime Laboratory 1 (2001) (“The review of the laboratory notes revealed that
they were often incomplete or inadequate to support the conclusions reached by the
examiner. No documentation existed that would allow the examiner to identify textile fibers
associated in one of the cases. No notations were present that would indicate a confirmation
or review by another qualified examiner was undertaken, especially in the cases where hair
evidence linked the suspect and victim.”). One of the cases was Pierce’s; the FBI found that
none of the hairs taken from Pierce exhibited the same microscopic characteristics as those
found at the crime scene. Id. at 3 (“[T]hese [pubic] hairs do not exhibit the same microscopic
characteristics as the suspect’s known pubic hairs.”). As a result, the Oklahoma City Police
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In the same year, the court reversed another rape conviction in which
Gilchrist had testified, Miller v. State,39 noting that Gilchrist had turned
over hair evidence to the defense in an untimely manner40 and had omitted
crucial conclusions from her report.41 Mitochondrial DNA later exonerated
Miller.42 Another suspect, Ronnie Lott, whom Gilchrist had cleared, was
eventually convicted of the crime.43 By this time, Gilchrist was so
notorious that Professor James E. Starrs critiqued her work in a forensic
science journal. He wrote, “[I]n her missionary zeal to promote the cause
of the prosecution she had put blinders on her professional conscience so
that the truth of science took a back seat to her acting the role of an
advocate.”44
Having been publicly rebuked in several judicial opinions and attacked
by other forensic scientists, one would expect that her career as an expert
either would be over or at least in jeopardy. Yet, despite this notoriety, she
worked for another decade, even receiving commendations and promotions.
A subsequent supervisor later wrote,
I knew from previous articles published over the years that she had been
the subject of scrutiny by the courts, but I assumed they had been
addressed by the department and resolved. I later found no indication in
her personnel file that they had ever been investigated or addressed
administratively.45

Known as “Black Magic,” she continued to be a prosecution superstar.46

Department had the evidence retested by a private DNA laboratory. DNA testing was not
available at the time of Pierce’s trial in 1986.
38. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that Gilchrist
does not have immunity).
39. 809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
40. Id. at 1320 (“What is even more disturbing . . . is the fact that Ms. Gilchrist’s pretrial
forensic report made absolutely no mention of her finding of a ‘unique characteristic’
concerning appellant’s pubic hairs. However, in his opening argument, the prosecutor
alerted the jury to the State’s expert’s finding of the ‘unique characteristic.’ Clearly, this
significant omission in Ms. Gilchrist’s report, whether intentional or inadvertent, coupled
with the State’s extreme tardiness in complying with the discovery order, resulted in trial by
ambush on a very critical piece of evidence.”).
41. Id. at 1319–20 (“[I]t was approximately two weeks after the deadline ordered by
Judge Owens that Ms. Gilchrist mailed the hair evidence to the appellant’s expert. Thus,
appellant’s expert received the evidence six and one-half days before trial began.”).
42. Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 87.
43. Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
44. James E. Starrs, The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. Forensic Sci. Soc’y
111, 132–33 (1991).
45. Memorandum from Captain Byron Boshell, Lab. Servs., to Major Garold Spencer,
Investigations Bureau (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
46. See also Fuhrman, supra note 27, at 71. Detective Bob Bemo claims that Gilchrist
began giving the detectives test results that were so good “that he didn’t believe [she] was
doing proper lab work, because her results were ‘too good.’ Bemo says that now, but it
didn’t stop him and his partner Bill Cook from using Gilchrist’s lab results in many of their
cases.” Id. “Homicide detective Bill Cook had given Gilchrist the nickname ‘Black Magic’
because she was able to get results that no other chemist could. When Cook and other
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Given the many signals that her testimony was corrupt, prosecutors
should have stopped using her as a witness.47 When interviewed by Dan
Rather in 2001, John Wilson, the expert who filed the ethics complaint
against her, provided this perspective: “The whole criminal justice system
has failed.”48 He then elaborated, “[Y]ou have to look at the prosecutor’s
office, that they had to understand what’s been going on. They had to have
seen all the flags that’s been waved.” At the same time, the former chief of
police said, “[T]he district attorney’s office loved having her as a
witness.”49
D. Michael West
1. The Early Years
Dr. Michael West, a Mississippi dentist, became infamous in the early
1990s. An article in The National Law Journal about him was entitled
“Expert” Science Under Fire in Capital Cases.50 Two years later The ABA
Journal noted that “West’s self-proclaimed forensic abilities . . . have long
been questioned by many of his peers.”51 In 1992, West matched a bite
mark found on a rape victim with the teeth of Jonny Bourn, making a
positive identification. DNA analysis of skin taken from fingernail
scrapings of the victim conclusively excluded Bourn.52
Although he testified most often as a forensic dentist, West did not
restrict himself to bite mark identifications. He testified about tool marks,
shoeprints, fingernail comparisons, knife wound comparisons, and other
issues seemingly beyond his expertise.53 In other cases, West identified a

homicide detectives gave Gilchrist hair samples from a suspect, they would often let her
know that this was the person they wanted to arrest.” Id. at 91.
47. See id. at 223 (“If [Gilchrist] were simply incompetent, her mistakes would have
been all over the map. Instead, her mistakes benefited the prosecution.”).
48. 60 Minutes: Under the Microscope: Forensics Scientist Joyce Gilchrist’s Lab Work
Is Under Scrutiny (CBS television broadcast May 8, 2001).
49. Id.
50. Marcia Coyle, “Expert” Science Under Fire in Capital Cases, Nat’l L.J., July 11,
1994, at A1.
51. Mark Hansen, Out of the Blue, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 50, 50–51. Dr. Michael West
estimates that he has testified about fifty-five times over the past decade. A third of these
cases were capital prosecutions and he has only “lost” one case. Id. One of the authors also
wrote about him. See Giannelli, supra note 1; Paul C. Giannelli, Op-Ed., When the Evidence
Is a Matter of Life and Death, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1994, at E15.
52. Hansen, supra note 51, at 53.
53. “West’s proclaimed expertise is not limited to bite marks. In fact, he has created a
comfy niche, mostly as a prosecution expert, matching not only bite marks with teeth, but
also wounds with weapons, shoes with footprints and fingernails with scratches, even spills
with stains.” Hansen, supra note 51, at 51; see Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 800–01
(Miss. 2003) (“During a hearing, Dr. West stated that he has testified seventy-five times . . .
forty-one murder trials; thirty-two times as a wound pattern expert; one time as a trace metal
expert; three times as an expert regarding gun shot residue; three times as an expert in
gunshot reconstruction; three times as a death investigator expert; two times as a County
Coroner; six times in child abuse trials; three times as a crime scene investigator; and one
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footprint on a murdered girl’s face, matched a bruise on a murder victim’s
stomach with a hiking boot belonging to the defendant,54 and testified as a
burn pattern specialist.55 In one of these cases, the court even referred to
him as a “controversial ‘wound pattern analyst,’”56 a well-deserved label
because it is not clear that West or anyone else could do what he claimed to
do.
In case after case, West testified with certainty. He repeatedly stated his
opinion with the phrase “indeed and without doubt.”57 In addition, West
used alternate light imaging (which he somewhat immodestly called the
“West Phenomenon”) to detect and analyze wounds.58 He testified that this
phenomenon, which he was inexplicably unable to photograph, was a
generally accepted scientific technique. Nevertheless, the three experts who
West claimed used his procedure later testified that this was not so. In still
another capital murder case, West made a bite mark identification after
exhuming the corpse fourteen months after death. Once again, he used his
blue light (“West Phenomenon”) technique to visualize the wound, which
he then matched to the defendant’s teeth. The skin tissue surrounding the
mark was removed and placed in a preservative. Two weeks later,

time as a blood splatter expert. He also asserts that he has made 600 dental I.D.’s and 300
bite mark I.D.’s.”).
54. See State v. Van Winkle, 658 So. 2d 198, 200 (La. 1995) (conviction overturned)
(“Other forensic evidence was provided by Dr. West, a dentist and controversial ‘wound
pattern analyst’ from Hattiesburg, Mississippi. He testified that markings on Patrick’s
stomach were consistent with the soles of tennis shoe hiking boots seized from Patricia’s
bedroom. A defense expert, Dr. Singer, contested this, finding there was no reasonable
correlation between Patrick’s bruise pattern and the boot in Patricia’s room.”).
55. Hansen, supra note 51, at 53; see also Davis v. State, 611 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss.
1992). “[West] concluded that the wound was a bite mark consistent with having been
inflicted approximately three weeks previously.” Id. Dr. Richard Souviron, a forensic
odontologist from Miami, Florida, “testified that the wound on Davis’ arm was not a bite
mark, but even if it were, it was inconsistent with Mrs. Davis’ teeth.” Id.
56. Van Winkle, 658 So. 2d at 200.
57. In State v. Maxwell, a capital murder case, West testified that a butcher knife blade
“indeed and without doubt” caused skin wounds on two victims and a slash mark on a door.
Moreover, the broken handle of the knife “indeed and without doubt” caused bruises on the
accused’s hand. This testimony was virtually the only evidence connecting Maxwell to the
murders. See State v. Maxwell, No. 5139 (Miss. Cir. Ct. dismissed Apr. 24, 1992). In
another capital case, State v. Oppie, West conducted a fingernail/scratch mark comparison,
reporting that “indeed and without doubt” the scratches on the accused were made by the
victim’s fingernails. State v. Oppie, No. 90-10,600(3) (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1990). He
acknowledged, however, that he had failed to (1) make test marks with the fingernail, (2)
evaluate its class and individual characteristics, and (3) establish the reproducibility of such
marks. Am. Acad. of Forensic Sciences Ethics Comm., Case No. 143, at 2 (1994)
[hereinafter AAFS Comm.].
58. West used long wave ultraviolet blue light to visualize this phenomenon on the
defendant’s hands ten days after the murders. The knife had a wooden handle, one side of
which was missing and thus exposing three rivets.
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however, the preservative had erased the mark.59 The conviction was later
overturned.60
An ethics committee of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences
concluded that West had “misrepresented data in order to support his
testimony” and that the term “indeed and without doubt” was
unwarranted.61 Similarly, an ethics committee of the American Board of
Forensic Odontologists concluded that West had “materially misrepresented
the evidence and data.”62 It also concluded that the “West Phenomenon”
was not “founded on scientific principles” and that West had presented
testimony “outside the field of forensic odontology.”63 Finally, the Crime
Scene Certification Board of the International Association of Identification
concluded (but only by a majority) that there was a basis for the complaint
and provided West with an opportunity to relinquish his “Senior Crime
Scene Analyst” certification.64
2. The Later Years
At this point, one might have thought that West would have faded into
legal obscurity. Not at all. In Banks v. State,65 a 1997 capital murder case,
West testified as a prosecution witness, matching the accused’s teeth with
the bite marks in the remaining portion of a bologna sandwich found at the
crime scene. A defense expert was compelled to use photographs of the
sandwich because the sandwich was destroyed. Consequently, he was
unable to reach any definite conclusions.66 Reversing the conviction, the
Mississippi Supreme Court wrote that “the prejudicial impact of the State’s
destruction of the sandwich on the persuasive value of Banks’ case is

59. Coyle, supra note 50 (referring to Edward J. Castain, who represented Anthony
Keko, for the murder of his estranged wife).
60. See Keko v. Hingle, No. Civ. A. 98-2189, 1999 WL 508406, at *1 (E.D. La. July 8,
1999) (“After serving two years and one month of his sentence, Keko was released from jail
and granted a new trial based on the court’s determination that the prosecution had withheld
information regarding the qualifications of its chief witness, Dr. West. . . . On January 13,
1998, the State dismissed all charges against Keko. Keko filed the present action on July 27,
1998.”), aff’d, 318 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting West’s claim of absolute immunity for
his pretrial conduct in Keko’s prosecution).
61. AAFS Comm., supra note 57, at 3. The committee recommended that West, a
fellow in the odontology section, be expelled. See also Steven C. Batterman, President, Am.
Acad. of Forensic Sciences, Letter to the Editor, AAFS Did Not Deny Due Process to Dr.
West, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at A20.
62. Am. Bd. of Forensic Odontology Ethics Comm., Complaint 93-B (1994).
63. Id. The committee recommended a one-year suspension, which was accepted by the
American Board of Forensic Odontology Board of Directors on May 18, 1994. West
appealed this decision. The appeal was denied.
64. When informed of this development, West resigned. Letter from Kenneth B. Zercie,
Chairman, Crime Scene Certification Bd., to John Holdridge, Att’y, Capital Trial Assistance
Project (Aug. 16, 1993) (on file with author).
65. 725 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 1997).
66. See id. at 713–14.
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plainly apparent, and West’s destruction of the sandwich was unnecessary
and inexcusable.”67
In Brooks v. State,68 a subsequent case decided in 1999, the Court upheld
the use of West’s bite mark testimony, acknowledging, however, the need
for defense experts in bite mark cases.69 A blistering dissent pointed out
that there were only two linear marks on the victim and the defense expert
could not say that they were even bite marks. Moreover, the dissent
commented on West’s proclivity “to boldly go where no expert has gone
before,”70 to lose evidence,71 and to create new fields of expertise.72 The
dissent concluded, “This Court’s apparent willingness to allow West to
testify to anything and everything so long as the defense is permitted to
cross-examine him may be expedient for prosecutors but it is harmful to the
criminal justice system.”73
In 2001, an enterprising attorney, who had represented a defendant
convicted on bite mark evidence but later exonerated with DNA evidence,
decided to give West a blind proficiency test.74 Using a ruse, he hired West
to compare the bite mark in a prior murder case (photographed at the time
of autopsy) with dental models supplied by a foil. In West’s videotaped
report, he concluded, “Finding this many patterns on this injury, I believe,

67. Id. at 716.
68. 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999).
69. “If expert testimony regarding bite-mark evidence is allowed by the trial court, the
defense should be given the opportunity to present evidence that challenges the reliability of
bite-mark comparisons . . . .” Id. at 739.
70. Id. at 748 (“In Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 897 (Miss. 1994), West testified
that the victim’s body was covered in teeth marks inflicted by the defendant. On appeal, Dr.
Mincer gave an affidavit to the effect that the marks appeared to be ant bites. In Davis v.
State, 611 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss. 1992), West concluded that ‘the wound was a bite mark
consistent with having been inflicted approximately three weeks previously.’ But Dr.
Richard Souviron, a forensic odontologist from Miami, Florida, ‘testified that the wound on
Davis’ arm was not a bite mark, but even if it were, it was inconsistent with Mrs. Davis’
teeth.’”).
71. Id. at 750 (“West seems to have difficulty in keeping up with evidence. In the
instant case, he lost the [sic] not only the mold to Brooks’s lower teeth but also the mold of
another suspect’s teeth. In [Banks], this Court was forced to reverse where West testified
that the defendant’s teeth correlated to marks in a sandwich left at the crime scene but failed
to preserve the sandwich so that the defense could make its own comparisons.”).
72. Id. at 750 n.4 (“A Westlaw search reveals that Michael West is apparently the only
person testifying about the ‘science’ of ‘wound pattern analysis.’”).
73. Id. at 750 (citation omitted).
74. The attorney, Christopher J. Plourd, represented Ray Krone, who had been convicted
of capital murder and sentenced to death based on the testimony of a forensic dentist. In
State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621, 622–23 (Ariz. 1995), two experienced experts concluded that
the defendant had made the bite mark found on a murder victim: “The bite marks were
crucial to the State’s case because there was very little other evidence to suggest Krone’s
guilt.” Id. at 622. The defendant, however, was later exonerated through DNA testing. See
Mark Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, A.B.A. J., July 2005, at 48, 49–50
(discussing Krone).
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can only lead an odontologist to one opinion that these teeth did create that
mark.”75 He was wrong; DNA had already identified the biter.
In 2002, West made his television debut on 60 Minutes. The interviewer
noted that “no practitioner [was] more suspect” than West and that West
could find evidence everyone else had missed.76 The next year, in Howard
v. State,77 the Mississippi Supreme Court once again upheld the
admissibility of West’s bite mark comparison. Once again, a dissenting
opinion vigorously disagreed, calling his testimony “junk science”78 and
noting that of the 100 board certified forensic odontologists in the United
States “about 90% of them have testified for the opposite side when Dr.
West is called as an expert witness.”79 By this time, even the majority of
the Court was having qualms. In Stubbs v. State,80 they wrote,
. . . [W]e in no way implied that Dr. Michael West was given carte
blanche to testify to anything and everything he so desired. . . . We
caution prosecutors and defense attorneys, as well as our learned trial
judges, to take care that Dr. West’s testimony as an expert is confined to
the area of his expertise . . . .81

Despite the controversy, prosecutors continue to use West. Why?
“[S]ome prosecutors are too willing to turn to somebody like West when
they lack the evidence they believe they need to tie a suspect to a crime.”82
Yet one prosecutor believes that West is merely ahead of his time: “‘I’m
quite confident in the guy, . . . I have a lot of faith in him. And I think he
makes one heck of a witness.’”83 Indeed and without doubt.
At present, West is preparing to testify in the retrial of Kennedy
Brewer,84 who was granted a new trial because DNA analysis of the murder
victim’s vaginal swab had eliminated him as the source of semen. West has
made a positive identification and is once again prepared to express his
unqualified opinion at the retrial.85 The question remains: why would a
75. Affidavit of Christopher J. Plourd at 5, State v. Brewer, No. 5999 (Miss. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 15, 2005) (quoting West’s video report) (affidavit and video report on file with author).
West also stated, “I feel very confident that there are enough points of unique individual
characteristics in this study model to say that these teeth inflicted this bite mark.” Id.
76. 60 Minutes: Forensic Evidence: Skepticism Surrounding Dr. Michael West’s Use of
Bite Mark Analysis in Murder Cases (CBS television broadcast Feb. 17, 2002) [hereinafter
60 Minutes: Forensic Evidence].
77. 853 So. 2d 781 (Miss. 2003).
78. Id. at 799.
79. Id. at 801.
80. 845 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 2003).
81. Id. at 670.
82. Hansen, supra note 51, at 51–52.
83. Id. at 54 (quoting James Maxwell, Assistant District Attorney, Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana).
84. See Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1998).
85. See Shaila Dewan, Despite DNA Test, Prosecutor Is Retrying Rape-Murder Case,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2007, at A1 (“The state’s star witness was Dr. Michael West . . . who
had become a controversial expert in the identification of bite marks. Dr. West’s findings
have been contradicted by DNA evidence in at least two other cases.”); 60 Minutes:
Forensic Evidence, supra note 76.
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prosecutor call him as a witness at this point? As Newsweek noted in 2001,
“West has been saving tough cases for police and prosecutors for more than
15 years—a much-sought-after clutch witness who, by testifying in 71 trials
in nine states, has helped send dozens of defendants away.”86
The reckless use of a tainted expert should be considered a due process
violation. An analogy to a prosecutor’s obligation to determine whether an
expert is testifying truthfully concerning his credentials is instructive.
People v. Cornille87 involved a prosecution expert who turned out to be an
imposter and had testified falsely about his qualifications.88 The Illinois
Supreme Court found a due process violation, commenting,
. . . [U]nder certain circumstances the prosecutor should not be
permitted to avoid responsibility for the false testimony of a government
witness by failing to examine readily available information that would
establish that the witness is lying. It would have been a simple procedure
in this case for the State to have verified Michaelson’s qualifications
before he testified at Cornille’s trial. As a direct result of its failure to do
so, false testimony occurred at the trial, and a fraud was perpetrated on the
court and on the defendant.89

A similar due process obligation should extend to the content of an expert’s
testimony, especially one with a checkered history.90

86. Andrew Murr, A Dentist Takes the Stand, Newsweek, Aug. 20, 2001, at 24. “But his
performance as an expert witness has long been controversial. Defense lawyers call him a
‘snake-oil salesman’ peddling ‘junk science’ to credulous judges and juries.” Id.
87. 448 N.E.2d 857 (Ill. 1983).
88. Id. at 862 (“In fact, the transcripts show that Michaelson had a record of extremely
low scholarship; that he had been suspended on several occasions for his lack of academic
diligence; and that he had not received an academic degree from any of the schools.”).
89. Id. at 865; see also id. at 865–66 (“Moreover, it is obvious that every party,
including the State, has an obligation to verify the credentials of its expert witnesses. It is
only on the basis of these credentials that experts are permitted to offer their professional
opinions concerning the factual issues disputed in the criminal proceeding. This type of
purportedly objective opinion testimony may have considerable influence on the jury, and
the rules for qualifying expert witnesses are designed to ensure that only genuine experts will
offer it.”).
90. In Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 807 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 424
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970), the court held that reckless use of highly suspicious false testimony
violates due process.
Due process of law does not tolerate a prosecutor’s selective inattention to such
significant facts. . . . It imposes as well an affirmative duty to avoid even
unintentional deception and misrepresentation, and in fulfilling that duty the
prosecutor must undertake careful study of his case and exercise diligence in its
preparation, particularly where he is confronted with facts tending to cast doubt
upon his witness’ testimony.
Id. at 808–09; see also Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir.
2001) (“[A prosecutor’s due process duty] requires a prosecutor to act when put on notice of
the real possibility of false testimony. This duty is not discharged by attempting to finesse
the problem by pressing ahead without a diligent and a good faith attempt to resolve it. A
prosecutor cannot avoid this obligation by refusing to search for the truth and remaining
willfully ignorant of the facts.”). In Part IV, we propose a similar rule as an ethical standard
for prosecutors.

GIANNELLI MCMUNIGAL AFTER BP

2007]

12/5/2007 3:36:19 PM

PROSECUTORS, ETHICS, AND EXPERT WITNESSES

1507

II. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
The general rubric of “discovery” is typically used to cover both
inculpatory and exculpatory information. It is helpful, though, to
distinguish between inculpatory and exculpatory information for two
reasons. First, the rules regarding each rest on different legal foundations.
The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to pretrial
discovery of inculpatory information.91 Rather, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 (or a parallel state rule) is the primary source of the
prosecutor’s obligation to provide the defendant with advance notice of
inculpatory information. When it comes to disclosure of exculpatory
information, by contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized a prosecutorial
disclosure obligation grounded in due process.92 There also exists an
explicit ethical rule requiring prosecutors to turn over exculpatory
information to a defendant.93
The second reason for distinguishing in our discussion between
disclosure of inculpatory and exculpatory information is that the nature of
the typical prosecutorial misconduct regarding each is different—late
disclosure with inculpatory information versus nondisclosure with
exculpatory information, although there is some overlap.94
A. Inculpatory Information
The importance of comprehensive discovery in cases in which scientific
proof is offered in evidence cannot be overstated. As the Advisory
Committee note to the federal discovery rule comments, “[I]t is difficult to
test expert testimony at trial without advance notice and preparation.”95
The American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Standards note that
the “need for full and fair disclosure is especially apparent with respect to
scientific proof and the testimony of experts. This sort of evidence is
practically impossible for the adversary to test or rebut at trial without an
advance opportunity to examine it closely.”96 Moreover, the National
Academy of Sciences has recommended extensive discovery in DNA cases:
“All data and laboratory records generated by analysis of DNA samples
should be made freely available to all parties. Such access is essential for
Indeed, the President’s DNA Initiative
evaluating the analysis.”97
91. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . . .”).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 133–37.
93. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (2007).
94. There can also be late disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See infra text
accompanying notes 138–42.
95. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note. See generally Paul C. Giannelli,
Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1991).
96. Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure
Before Trial Standard 2.1, at 66 (Approved Draft 1970).
97. Nat’l Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 23 (1992); id. at 146
(“The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to defense counsel and experts
retained by the defendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the evidence.”);
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emphasizes the value of pretrial discovery: “Early disclosure can have the
following benefits: [1] Avoiding surprise and unnecessary delay. [2]
Identifying the need for defense expert services.
[3] Facilitating
exoneration of the innocent and encouraging plea negotiations if DNA
evidence confirms guilt.”98
Several chronic problems relating to discovery abuses are addressed in
this section.
1. Late Disclosure
One way to undercut the defense’s ability to confront expert testimony is
to delay disclosure. This abuse is not uncommon.
a. Laboratory Reports
Discovery provisions relating to experts typically require pretrial
disclosure of laboratory reports.99 The widespread adoption of such
provisions should make disclosure routine in all but the most exceptional
cases. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find discovery violations due to
tardy disclosure. For example, in United States v. Wicker,100 the testimony
of a prosecution expert was excluded as a discovery violation sanction
because the laboratory report had not been disclosed in a timely manner.
For the same reason, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
upheld the exclusion of the prosecution’s DNA evidence in United States v.
Davis.101 The prosecution in Davis offered no reasons for the delay,102 and
the court found prejudice.
The government not only produced the DNA evidence a month late, but it
did so almost literally on the eve of trial, making it virtually impossible,
absent a continuance, for defendants to evaluate and confront the evidence
see also id. at 105 (“Case records—such as notes, worksheets, autoradiographs, and
population databanks—and other data or records that support examiners’ conclusions are
prepared, retained by the laboratory, and made available for inspection on court order after
review of the reasonableness of a request.”); Nat’l Research Council, The Evaluation of
Forensic DNA Evidence 167–69 (1996) (“Certainly, there are no strictly scientific
justifications for withholding information in the discovery process, and in Chapter 3 we
discussed the importance of full, written documentation of all aspects of DNA laboratory
operations. Such documentation would facilitate technical review of laboratory work, both
within the laboratory and by outside experts. . . . Our recommendation that all aspects of
DNA testing be fully documented is most valuable when this documentation is discoverable
in advance of trial.”).
98. President’s DNA Initiative: Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the Court
(National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, CD-ROM, n.d.) (on file with
author).
99. See Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 35, § 3.03 (discussing discovery
provisions relating to scientific reports).
100. 848 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1988).
101. 244 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2001).
102. Id. at 671 (“Because the government has not given any explanation for the delay, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to assess whether the government had any justification for the
delay.”).
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against them. DNA evidence is scientific and highly technical in nature;
it would have required thorough investigation by defense counsel,
including almost certainly retaining an expert witness or witnesses.103

But exclusion of the prosecution expert’s testimony is not automatic.104
Rather, it is the most drastic sanction and requires justification.105 The
choice of sanction rests within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate
courts will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. In exercising its
discretion, the trial court typically considers three factors: (1) the reason for
the violation, including whether the prosecution acted in bad faith; (2) “the
extent of prejudice to the defendant”; and (3) “the feasibility of curing the
prejudice with a continuance.”106 Courts frequently cite the failure of
defense counsel to seek a continuance as evidence that the accused did not
suffer prejudice. This, of course, ignores the realities of trial practice—the
difficulty encountered by defense attorneys in preparing for trial and
rescheduling other cases. In short, the accused is faced with what one court
called a “Hobson’s choice”107—go to trial perhaps without adequate
preparation or be forced to delay, which, in turn, provides the prosecution
with a “tactical advantage” because “even with a continuance, the defense
[is] forced to play catch-up.”108

103. Id.
104. E.g., United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 555–56 (1st Cir. 1999). In this case,
during direct examination of a prosecution witness, “the witness disclosed for the first time
the existence of a laboratory test showing that the [ship’s] carpet tested negative for the
presence of marijuana.” Id. The court held that a mistrial was not required because defense
counsel “effectively cross-examined the government witness who disclosed the report, and
used the test results in its closing argument.” Id.; see also United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d
955, 958 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Because the government did not learn of this evidence [medical
report and photographs] until a late date and acted expeditiously to deliver it to the defense,
we conclude that the government did not act in bad faith in failing to disclose the evidence
sooner.”); United States v. Edmonson, 962 F.2d 1535, 1545–46 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a fingerprint report prepared a month after trial commenced but promptly provided to
defense at that time demonstrated good faith); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 626 A.2d
109, 112 (Pa. 1993) (finding that results of a semen test conducted on the first day of trial
and promptly turned over to defense did not violate discovery rules unless the results were
deliberately withheld).
105. See United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Our prior cases
indicate that a district court must substantiate a defendant’s claim of prejudice before
adopting the most severe discovery sanction available—wholesale exclusion of evidence.
We therefore reverse the district court’s order.”); United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251,
1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We note that the sanction requested by Defendant—exclusion of the
witnesses’ expert testimony—is almost never imposed ‘in the absence of a constitutional
violation or statutory authority for such exclusion.’” (citation omitted)).
106. Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061.
107. See Ayres v. State, 436 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1981) (“The State contends that its offer
of a continuance to defendant (on the eve of trial and before receipt of the report) and
defendant’s decline of the offer bars assertion of a suppression contention. We consider that
to have been a ‘Hobson’s choice’ in view of the prior continuance of four months that was
granted the State for the express purpose of obtaining an analysis of the State’s physical
evidence and presumably for arrangements to be made for an expert witness to testify as to
the report’s findings.” (citation omitted)).
108. Davis, 244 F.3d at 673.
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In some cases the abuses are recurrent and flagrant. For example, Joyce
Gilchrist frequently delayed the transfer of evidence for defense
examination, a practice for which she was repeatedly chastised by the
courts.109 Since a discovery request is directed to the prosecution, not the
expert, it seems highly unlikely that this type of misconduct could have
occurred so often without the prosecution’s awareness and acquiescence at
the least, and collusion at the worst.
b. Summaries
In 1994, Federal Rule 16 was amended to require a summary of expert
testimony.110 This meant that federal prosecutors could no longer surprise
defendants by calling experts who had not written reports. Further, the
basis of the expert’s opinion would now have to be disclosed. The
Advisory Committee notes commented,
The amendment is intended to minimize surprise that often results from
unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to
provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the
expert’s testimony through focused cross-examination. . . . Although no
specific timing requirements are included [in the amendment], it is
expected that the parties will make their requests and disclosures in a
timely fashion.111

Nevertheless, one of the first cases examining the amendment involved
delayed disclosure.112 In United States v. Richmond,113 the district court

109. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1319–20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (“[I]t was
approximately two weeks after the deadline ordered by Judge Owens that Ms. Gilchrist
mailed the hair evidence to the appellant’s expert. Thus, appellant’s expert received the
evidence six and one-half days before trial began.”); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1261
(Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (“Instead of following either the letter of the Order or taking steps
to have the Order changed or clarified by the court, she took it upon herself to determine the
portions of the Order with which she wished to comply. This was not her decision to
make.”); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (“Ms. Gilchrist’s
delay and neglect in not completing her forensic examination and report . . . was
inexcusable, since she began her forensic examination in December of 1982.”).
110. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G). The Rule states,
At the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written
summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702,
703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial. If the
government requests discovery under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) and the defendant
complies, the government must, at the defendant’s request, give to the defendant a
written summary of testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702,
703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial on the issue of the
defendant’s mental condition. The summary provided under this subparagraph
must describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and
the witness’s qualifications.
Id.
111. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note.
112. Controversies concerning the amount of disclosure also soon developed. See United
States v. Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prosecution “barely”
met the minimum requirements and cautioning, “[W]e strongly encourage the government to
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wrote, “The government’s response is totally unrealistic given the purposes
which prompted enactment of the Rule. . . . [D]isclosure three days before
trial is absurd.”114
c. Continuing Duty to Disclose
A closely related issue is the prosecution’s continuing duty to disclose
newly developed information after a discovery request has been made.
Federal Rule 16(c) recognizes a “continuing duty to disclose” scientific
reports if, prior to or during trial, new reports are prepared. The rationale
for such a provision is self-evident. The prosecutor should not be permitted
to avoid discovery obligations simply because a scientific report is
submitted after the prosecutor has complied with an initial discovery
request. In United States v. Kelly,115 neutron activation tests were
conducted after the trial court ordered discovery of scientific reports. The
defense, however, was not informed of the tests until trial. After
recognizing the prosecution’s continuing duty to disclose the results of
scientific tests, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote,
“The course of the government smacks too much of a trial by ambush, in
violation of the spirit of the rules. A new trial is required, with a fair
opportunity for the defense to run its own neutron activation tests of the
material . . . .”116
2. Omitting Information from Lab Reports
Leaving important information out of a laboratory report is another
practice that undermines a defendant’s ability to confront expert testimony.
In the Duke lacrosse case, the North Carolina Bar Association found that
the prosecutor, Michael B. Nifong, violated numerous ethical rules in his
offer more specific descriptions of the opinions of the witnesses, foundations for their
testimony, and their qualifications.”).
113. 153 F.R.D. 7 (D. Mass. 1994).
114. Id. at 8.
First, it is hard to imagine a situation in which the government would not learn of
the need for expert testimony until the trial is underway except as rebuttal
testimony. The Rule, by its explicit terms, does not require disclosure of any
experts to be called in rebuttal. Rather, disclosure is limited to experts to be called
by the government during its case in chief.
Id.
115. 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969).
116. Id. at 29; see also United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Boney, 572 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1978) (involving a drug report); United
States v. Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193, 1197–98 (5th Cir. 1977) (involving a polarimeter test);
Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 2006) (holding that when a medical examiner
investigator realized that he had been mistaken in his deposition testimony, but this
information was not given to defense prior to the trial, “the State also had an obligation to
disclose any material change in that statement”); State v. Wilson, 507 N.E.2d 1109, 1110–12
(Ohio 1987) (holding that the failure to update a neutron activation analysis report resulted in
“trial by ambush”); Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220, 224 (Miss. 1985) (finding that the
state violated its continuing duty to disclose regarding a gunshot residue test).
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handling of DNA evidence.117 DNA analysis of a rape kit revealed the
profiles of multiple unidentified males. Nifong, however, instructed the
examiner (Dr. Brian Meehan) to write a report mentioning only positive
matches, conduct that violated, inter alia, a discovery rule.118 In an
Oklahoma case, the appellate court wrote that an expert’s report “was at
best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate and misleading” and the expert
conceded at trial that “she failed to include her conclusion” in the report.119
According to the court, “This significant omission, whether intentional or
inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .”120
This problem arises because, although lab reports are discoverable,
discovery provisions do not specify the content of the report.121 For
example, in Harrison v. State,122 the prosecution turned over an autopsy
report in discovery.123 At trial the pathologist testified about a number of
factors not disclosed to the defense, including the critical fact that the
murder victim had been raped, the qualifying circumstance for imposing the

117. See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 20–
24, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C.
State Bar Jul. 31, 2007). He was subsequently found in contempt by the trial judge in the
case. See Day in Jail for Ex-Duke Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2007, at A9. For an indepth discussion and analysis of the Duke lacrosse case, see Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke
Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to “Do
Justice,” 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1337 (2007).
118. Revised Rules of Prof’l Conduct of the N.C. State Bar R. 3.4(c) (1997). He also
violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting false statements of material fact or law to a tribunal) and
compounded this error by falsely representing to the court and opposing counsel that he had
provided all discoverable information. Rule 4.1 (prohibiting false statements of material fact
to a third person in course of representing a client); Rule 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentations). An additional violation of Rules
3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) occurred at a December 15, 2006, hearing. He also lied to the Grievance
Committee investigating his conduct. See Revised Rules of Prof’l Conduct of the N.C. State
Bar R. (1997).
119. McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
120. Id. (citations omitted); see also Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1991) (“What is even more disturbing . . . is the fact that Ms. Gilchrist’s pretrial
forensic report made absolutely no mention of her finding of a ‘unique characteristic’
concerning appellant’s pubic hairs. However, in his opening argument, the prosecutor
alerted the jury to the State’s expert’s finding of the ‘unique characteristic.’ Clearly, this
significant omission in Ms. Gilchrist’s report, whether intentional or inadvertent, coupled
with the State’s extreme tardiness in complying with the discovery order, resulted in trial by
ambush on a very critical piece of evidence.”).
121. Sometimes the crucial information is omitted from the laboratory report, and the
prosecutor is left in the dark along with the defense counsel. For example, in Jones v. City of
Chicago, a Chicago crime lab technician, after talking to detectives, intentionally deleted an
exculpatory conclusion from her report in a murder case. 856 F.2d 985, 988–93 (7th Cir.
1988); id. at 988 (calling the deletion “a frightening abuse of power by members of the
Chicago police force”). The court also noted, “[P]olice laboratory technician Mary
Furlong . . . discovered that [defendant] George Jones had different semen and blood types
from the types found in [the victim’s] vagina. Furlong failed to include this information in
the lab report . . . .” Id. at 991. Sometimes the information is favorable, which raises Brady
issues as discussed below. See infra notes 133–37.
122. 635 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 1994) (en banc).
123. See id. at 898.
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death penalty. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that it could not
“countenance or condone the willful withholding of crucial evidence during
discovery.”124 In State v. Wilson,125 a laboratory report indicated that a
gunshot residue test was inconclusive. However, at trial the expert testified
that evidence of barium (a primer residue) alone was consistent with the
firing of a gun. The defense was never informed of this opinion and thus
was misled by the report. The Supreme Court of Ohio criticized the
prosecutor’s conduct as “trial by ambush.”126
Often, such tactics are intentional. In a symposium on the ethical
responsibilities of forensic scientists, one article discussed laboratory
reporting practices, including (1) “preparation of reports containing
minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for
cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings without an interpretation on
the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be provided from
the witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a report to
trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”127
3. Failing to Prepare a Lab Report
Another recurring problem is an expert failing entirely to prepare a
report. Roy Brown spent fifteen years in prison for murder before he was
exonerated by DNA evidence.128 The case rested largely on bite marks on
the victim’s body that a local dentist testified matched Brown’s teeth.129
Unbeknownst to the defense, a leading forensic odontologist, Lowell
Levine, had analyzed the bite marks on the victim and concluded that the
one mark he could interpret excluded Brown as the source of the mark. The
prosecutor, however, “never asked Dr. Levine to file an official report . . . .
Instead, the prosecutors relied on another expert, a local dentist, whose
testimony helped convict Mr. Brown.”130

124. Id. at 900. “The evidence withheld from the defense was in the form of expert
opinion testimony, and was the only proof offered on the issue of rape, a necessary element
of the offense charged in the indictment.” Id. at 896.
125. 507 N.E.2d 1109 (Ohio 1987).
126. Id. at 1112.
127. Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring
the Limits, 34 J. Forensic Sci. 719, 724 (1989).
128. See People v. Brown, 600 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 1993) (upholding
conviction). Rejecting a postconviction discovery request, another court later wrote, “In the
instant case DNA testing was available at the time of investigation and trial but the
defendant failed to avail himself of such procedures.” People v. Brown, 618 N.Y.S.2d 188,
190 (Cayuga County Ct. 1994). Dr. Levine’s opinion could also be characterized as Brady
material. See infra text accompanying notes 133–37.
129. Fernanda Santos, Evidence from Bite Marks, It Turns Out, Is Not So Elementary,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2007, at WK4 (“At the time of his conviction, Mr. Brown, 46, was
missing two front teeth. The bite marks, meanwhile, had six tooth imprints.”).
130. Fernanda Santos, With DNA from Exhumed Body, Man Finally Wins Freedom, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 2007, at B5.
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B. Exculpatory Information
The duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is grounded in constitutional
due process, ethical precepts, and pretrial discovery rules.131 Although
there is an obvious overlap among these sources of the duty to disclose,
there are also important differences.132
1. Due Process
Due process, according to Brady v. Maryland,133 includes the right to the
disclosure of exculpatory material evidence in the possession of the
prosecution. Numerous scientific evidence cases have involved Brady
issues.134 For example, in Hilliard v. Williams,135 a Tennessee prosecutor
deliberately suppressed an exculpatory Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) forensic report, which determined that the devastating blood stains in
a murder case were not blood stains. In Gordon v. Thornberg,136 the
accused’s shoes were sent to the FBI laboratory, which determined that
there were no flammable substances on the shoes. “Subsequently, the shoes
were sent to the University of Rhode Island’s crime laboratory. The URI
131. Some jurisdictions have discovery provisions that cover this subject. See, e.g., Ohio
R. Crim. P. 16(B)(1)(f).
132. As discussed below, the constitutional duty to disclose is a trial, not pretrial, right.
Moreover, in contrast to the constitutional duty, the ethical rule and discovery provisions do
not contain a “materiality” requirement.
133. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”).
134. In United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), the prosecution charged
Orville Stifel with murdering his former girlfriend’s fiancé by sending a bomb through the
mail. Crucial prosecution evidence involved neutron activation analysis performed on bomb
debris (vinyl tape, metal cap, cardboard mailing tube, and paper gummed label) and similar
items obtained from Stifel’s place of employment. The prosecution expert testified that the
label and cardboard tube were “of the same type and same manufacture.” Id. at 436 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The metal cap and tape were “of the same manufacture” and from
the “same batch”—one day’s manufacturing production. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). After his conviction, Stifel filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
See United States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1528 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The Freedom of
Information Act material revealed the existence of another suspect in the bombing and
discrepancies about the background tests on the tape. Id. As a result, Stifel filed a
postconviction petition, alleging a Brady violation. He argued that the expert, when crossexamined, had failed to disclose that additional tests had been performed on the tape. The
court disagreed that the expert had misrepresented the facts on this issue, but noted the
misleading character of this information in granting relief: “[H]ad the defense known of the
November 1968 tests performed by [the expert] on tape obtained from Plymouth Rubber
Company, it could have used this evidence to further impeach the credibility of [the expert’s]
scientific methods.” Id. at 1543; see also Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 35, § 3.12, at
184 (listing cases).
135. 516 F.2d 1344, 1346 (6th Cir. 1975). In an unreported opinion overturning Lilly
Hilliard’s first conviction, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the blood on
Hilliard’s jacket was “‘[o]f quite devastating impact.’” Id. at 1351. After spending a year in
prison, Hilliard was acquitted in a retrial in which the FBI report was admitted into evidence.
136. 790 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1992).
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crime lab found gasoline on the shoes. When the existence of the negative
FBI lab report became known, the state court granted Mr. Gordon’s motion
for a mistrial.”137
The Brady rule raises a number of issues: (1) the timing of disclosure,
(2) the “exculpatory” requirement, (3) the “materiality” requirement, (4)
appropriate sanctions, and (5) Brady’s applicability to crime laboratories.
a. Timing of Disclosure
Brady is a trial right, not a pretrial disclosure rule. Nevertheless,
exculpatory evidence must be disclosed in time for defense counsel to make
use of it.138 Here, as with the discovery rules discussed above, delayed
disclosure may place a defendant in an untenable position. In Ex parte
Mowbray,139 a murder case, the prosecutor used a blood spatter expert to
refute the defense suicide theory. According to the prosecutor, his case
“depended upon” this evidence. Prior to trial, the prosecution retained
another expert, Herbert MacDonell, considered the premier expert in the
field. After reviewing the crime scene, the physical evidence and the
photographs, MacDonell concluded months before trial that “it was more
probable than not that the deceased died from a suicide rather than a
homicide.”140 Yet the defense did not receive his written report until ten
days before trial and then only after the trial judge threatened sanctions.
MacDonell never testified.141 The court wrote,
. . . State’s counsel early on recognized the potential lethal effect of
MacDonell’s testimony on their theory of the case, and beginning in
November and continuing until May they engaged in a deliberate course
of conduct to keep MacDonell’s findings and opinions from Applicant’s
counsel until the last days before trial. Even then they caused Applicant’s
counsel to believe MacDonell would be a witness and available for crossexamination.142

137. Id. at 375 n.1. The vice in this case was not the request for a second opinion but
rather the failure to disclose the opinion contained in the FBI report.
138. 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b), at 487 (2d ed. 1999).
139. 943 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc). “The State had an obligation to
be forthcoming when the Brady motion was heard and granted in March. Instead, it chose to
suppress MacDonell’s exculpatory evidence until its hand was forced by the trial judge only
days before trial, and, in so doing, the State denied Applicant due process.” Id. at 465
(internal quotation marks omitted). Fredda “Susan” Mowbray was acquitted on a retrial. See
Mowbray v. Cameron County, Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that no case
has extended Brady liability to laboratory technicians).
140. Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d at 463 (emphasis omitted).
141. Id. at 464.
142. Id. at 465 (quoting habeas judge); see also United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d
1373, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The late disclosure of this exculpatory information [negative
fingerprint report] is troubling, and it highlights the need for vigilance by prosecutors in
ensuring that government agents are informed of and respect Brady requirements.”); Ayres
v. State, 436 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1981) (finding a Brady violation in a rape case). In Ayres,
the court held, “We also conclude that the State’s delay in submitting the entire package of
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b. “Exculpatory” Requirement
Brady does not apply unless the evidence is exculpatory. Consequently,
labeling a laboratory report as inconclusive may relieve the prosecution of
the disclosure requirement. For example, in one case an inconclusive
handwriting report “was not exculpatory, but merely not inculpatory.”143
Similarly, a report showing that hair from a rape defendant was not found at
the scene of the crime was deemed a “neutral” report.144 However, as one
court correctly understood,
[S]uch a characterization [as neutral] often has little meaning; evidence
such as this may, because of its neutrality, tend to be favorable to the
accused. While it does not by any means establish his absence from the
scene of the crime, it does demonstrate that a number of factors which
could link the defendant to the crime do not.145

Similarly, in Bell v. Coughlin,146 the prosecution failed to turn over FBI
ballistics test results to the defense.
The lab positively matched a cartridge shell (B3) to the .45 caliber pistol
but reported that no conclusion could be reached with respect to the two
bullets (J/R2 and J/R4) in its possession. Thus, although the results of the
FBI tests may be characterized as mixed, they clearly contained
exculpatory material.147

c. Materiality Requirement
In the Brady context, materiality means outcome determinative. The
suppressed evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”148 This is an unnecessarily
stringent standard.149 In scientific evidence cases, problems have arisen
with determining what is “material” evidence.150 In Nelson v. Zant,151 the
physical evidence to the FBI was the probable cause of the late delivery of the report and the
unavailability of an FBI witness to testify as to its findings.” Id.
143. United States v. Hauff, 473 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1973).
144. Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241, 1243–44 (4th Cir. 1976). In Sadler v. State, the
prosecution’s failure to turn over an “inconclusive” DNA report did not violate Brady. 846
P.2d 377, 383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
145. Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 479 (4th Cir. 1974) (involving an FBI lab report on
shoeprint, soil sample, hair sample, murder weapon, and clothing).
146. 820 F. Supp. 780, 786–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 17 F.3d 390 (2d Cir. 1993).
147. Id. at 786–87 (citation omitted).
148. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
149. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685,
689–90 (2006) (“The most pernicious consequence of the judiciary’s radical reconstruction
of the concept of materiality has been to afford prosecutors an extraordinarily wide berth to
conceal favorable evidence from the defense in the completely rational expectation that the
suppression either will not be discovered or, if discovered, will be found by a reviewing
court to not be material.”).
150. E.g., Bonnell v. Mitchell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 698, 726–27 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(“Regarding the negative test result of the gun nitrates on the defendant’s jacket, there is no
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critical evidence in the case was a hair found on the victim’s body. The
state’s expert testified that the hair not only could have come from the
defendant but that it could only have come from about 120 people in the
entire Savannah area. The prosecution failed to disclose that the FBI had
also examined the hair and had concluded that the hair was not suitable for
comparison purposes. On review, the prosecution argued that this
information was not “material” within the meaning of Brady. The Supreme
Court of Georgia reversed.152
d. Application to Crime Laboratories
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended Brady to cover exculpatory
information in the control of the police.153 Some courts have explicitly
included crime labs within the reach of Brady. In one case, the Supreme
Court of California noted that a laboratory examiner “worked closely” with
prosecutors and was part of the investigative team.154 The court concluded
that the “prosecutor thus had the obligation to determine if the lab’s files
contained any exculpatory evidence, such as the worksheet, and disclose it
to petitioner.”155
In another case, a court wrote that an experienced crime lab technician
“must have known of his legal obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
to the prosecutors, their obligation to pass it along to the defense, and his

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this test
result been admitted. As the forensic scientist in this case testified regarding another matter,
a negative test result does not make a positive finding.”). But see People v. Salazar, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 262, 279 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]hile there is sufficient evidence in the record to
affirm the conviction, we cannot be confident in the jury’s verdict because of the Brady
violation. Had the jury been aware of Dr. Ribe’s credibility problems, which would have
cast doubt on the prosecution’s investigation, the case would have been cast in a different
light with a reasonable probability of a different result.”).
151. 405 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991).
152. Id. at 252. Scheck and his colleagues provide this vignette:
Analyst Maria Pulling reported that Reynolds matched none of the trace evidence.
She signed the report and forwarded it to the front desk of the lab for delivery to
the prosecutor and the defense. But the exculpatory report was never delivered to
the defense. Ten years later, the volunteer counsel . . . obtained DNA exonerations
of both men . . . . That was when Pulling first learned the case had gone to trial.
When she found out that her report had been concealed, she was astonished.
Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 174 (discussing Donald Reynolds’s case).
153. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (“[I]t may be said that no one doubts
that police investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know. But neither
is there any serious doubt that ‘procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the
prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to
every lawyer who deals with it.’ Since, then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the
government’s Brady responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from
disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the
police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the
government’s obligation to ensure fair trials.”).
154. In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 719 (Cal. 1998).
155. Id.
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obligation not to cover up a Brady violation by perjuring himself.”156
While the expert should have been on notice about perjury, it is less clear
that the Brady obligation would be known to lab personnel—without the
prosecutor tutoring the lab. How often do prosecutors discharge this duty?
Many lab examiners have never heard of Brady.
2. Ethical Rule
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor to “make timely disclosure to
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.”157 The
Model Rule is broader than the Brady rule. It has no materiality limitation
and it includes information as well as evidence. The ABA Criminal Justice
Standards also provide that a prosecutor should disclose “[a]ny material or
information within the prosecutor’s possession or control which tends to
negate the guilt of the defendant.”158 In the Duke lacrosse case, the
prosecutor violated North Carolina’s version of Model Rule 3.8(d) by
instructing the DNA analyst to write a report mentioning only positive
matches.159
As many commentators have recognized, disciplinary sanctions for
Brady violations appear to be illusory.160 As one scholar who researched
disciplinary actions against prosecutors noted, “When it comes to
disciplining a prosecutor who commits Brady-type misconduct . . .
Given this pattern of
punishment is virtually nonexistent.”161
156. Charles v. City of Boston, 365 F. Supp. 2d 82, 89 (D. Mass. 2005). But see
Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that extending Brady to lab
personnel is “unsound”); Mowbray v. Cameron County, Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir.
2001) (noting that no case has extended Brady liability to laboratory technicians).
157. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (2007) (special responsibilities of a
prosecutor). One would think “timely” would mean at least in time to make use of it at trial.
But what about in time for use in considering a guilty plea? Or making a motion to dismiss?
Or conducting an investigation?
158. Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii)
(3d ed. 1996).
159. See Revised N.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (1997); supra notes 118–19 and
accompanying text.
160. See Gershman, supra note 149, at 687 (“Brady is insufficiently enforced when
violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable when violations are hidden.”); Joseph
R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of
Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 833, 934 (1997)
(“We should not continue to permit the almost total lack of meaningful sanctions to enforce
the command of Brady to constitute our own sanction for the misconduct of our
prosecutors.”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 275, 281–82 (2004).
161. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 742 (1987). Furthermore, whether Brady applies to
posttrial exculpatory information is not clear. See Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Fingers
Pointed at HPD Crime Lab in Death Row Case, Houston Chron., Apr. 24, 2003, at 1A
(“[T]he attorneys handling his appeal discovered that before Rousseau’s trial, HPD’s
ballistics lab had matched the bullet that killed [the victim] to bullets from another killing . . .
[and] about one month after Rousseau was sentenced the police crime lab matched bullets
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nonenforcement of Model Rule 3.8(d), the disciplinary action in the Duke
lacrosse case is striking.
C. Recommendations
There are several ways these problems can be addressed. First, there is
little question that the common discovery provisions are flawed because
they fail to specify the contents of scientific reports. The primary objective
of discovery is to enable a defendant to address and challenge the accuracy
of the evidence presented against him. Lack of detail in an expert’s report
seriously compromises the defense’s ability to do this. Permitting forensic
experts to testify without first preparing a report is even worse.
Discovery provisions should be amended in accordance with the 2006
ABA Criminal Justice Standards on DNA Evidence.162 Part III of the
Standards includes provisions on DNA laboratories and the testing of
evidence.163 The Standards recommend that most laboratory protocols and
procedures be publicly available and that each step in the testing of DNA
evidence and in the interpretation of the test results be recorded
contemporaneously in case notes.164 Comprehensive laboratory reports are
recommended.165 Moreover, all case notes, raw electronic data, and lab
reports are discoverable.166 Under this approach, all tests are disclosed,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory. There is no materiality requirement
and pretrial disclosure is mandated. This information should be available
before plea negotiations commence.167
Second, ethical and discovery rules should explicitly require the
prosecutor to instruct crime laboratories and other experts of their Brady
obligations. The Supreme Court has imposed such a requirement with
Brady material concerning deals with witnesses, remarking that “procedures
and regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden and to

from both shootings to a gun found on Juan Guerrero, who was convicted of the other
murder. Prosecutors never turned over the crucial findings that would have supported
Rousseau’s innocence as required, his attorneys said.”).
162. The Standards cover a wide range of topics, including provisions on (1) the
collection, preservation, and retention of DNA evidence; (2) pretrial disclosure; (3) defense
testing and retesting; (4) the admissibility of DNA evidence; (5) postconviction testing; (6)
charging persons by DNA profile; and (7) DNA databases. See generally Standards for
Criminal Justice: Standards on DNA Evidence (2006).
163. The Standards mandate (1) laboratory accreditation every two years; (2) written
policies, including protocols for testing and interpreting test results; (3) quality assurance
procedures, including audits, proficiency testing, and corrective action protocols; (4)
procedures designed to minimize cognitive bias when interpreting test results; and (5) timely
reports of credible evidence of lab misconduct or serious negligence. Id.
164. See id. Standard 3.1 (testing laboratories), Standard 3.2 (testing and interpretation of
DNA evidence).
165. See id. Standard 3.3 (laboratory reports).
166. See id. Standard 4.1 (disclosure in pretrial proceedings).
167. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
Hastings L.J. 957 (1989) (discussing the importance of Brady disclosure during plea
negotiations). But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (rejecting this view).
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insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every
lawyer who deals with it.”168 The ABA recently recommended that
prosecutors should “[e]nsure that law enforcement agencies, laboratories
and other experts understand their obligations to inform prosecutors about
exculpatory or mitigating evidence.”169
Finally, the rules should be enforced. Discovery sanctions should be
imposed for late disclosure and other violations.
III. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
Presentation of misleading expert testimony can range from outright
fraud to more subtle tactics. The Model Rules prohibit knowingly using
false testimony170 and preclude an attorney from “knowingly . . . mak[ing]
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”171 They also forbid an
attorney from engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”172 The ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that it is
unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to “intentionally misstate the
evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”173 There are
also due process prohibitions against, as well as criminal statutes
prohibiting, knowingly using false testimony.174
A. Perjured Testimony
Pate175

Miller v.
is perhaps the most cited case of flagrant misconduct
involving scientific evidence. Prior to trial, a defense request for the
inspection of physical evidence that the prosecution intended to introduce at
trial was denied.176 At trial, a prosecution expert testified that stains on
underwear shorts were type A blood, which matched the defendant’s blood
168. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (finding a Brady violation even
though the prosecutor who tried the case was unaware of the deal made by another
prosecutor). See generally Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the failure of a district attorney to promulgate policies regarding the sharing of
information about informants and the failure to adequately train and supervise deputy district
attorneys on this subject was not protected by absolute immunity in a civil rights action).
169. ABA Criminal Justice Section’s Ad Hoc Innocence Comm. to Ensure the Integrity
of the Criminal Process, Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty 99
(Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter Achieving Justice].
170. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) prohibits an attorney from “offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007). The ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice also state that it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
“knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony
of witnesses.” Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function Standard
3-5.6(a) (3d ed. 1993).
171. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward the tribunal).
172. Id. R. 8.4(c) (misconduct).
173. Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 35.8(a).
174. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957);
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
175. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
176. Id. at 2.
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type.177 The prosecution repeatedly referred to this “crucial testimony” in
closing argument, waving the “bloody” shorts in front of the jury.178 At a
subsequent federal habeas corpus hearing, the defense had the opportunity
to examine the shorts and discovered that the stains were paint, not blood.
In addition, these proceedings indicated that the prosecutor was aware of
this fact at the time of trial.179 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
“the Fourteenth Amendment [Due Process Clause] cannot tolerate a state
criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence.”180
Outright mendacity is probably rare. Yet, as discussed below, other more
common practices probe and press ethical boundaries.
B. Witness Preparation
In some countries, it is viewed as unethical for a lawyer to meet with a
witness to prepare testimony. But in our adversary system, a lawyer is
viewed as acting incompetently if she fails to meet with and prepare a
witness. The adversary process requires attorneys to put forth their
strongest case, a requirement that incentivizes lawyers to pressure their
witnesses to testify in a way most favorable to the lawyers’ clients’
positions.181 Sometimes the pressure is overt.182 At other times it is subtle
but nevertheless unmistakable.183 The issue has been raised so often that
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards include this provision: “A prosecutor
who engages an expert for an opinion should respect the independence of

177. Id. at 3–4.
178. Id. at 5–6. A later investigation established that the stains were both blood and paint.
See The Vindication of a Prosecutor, 59 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 335, 335
(1968).
179. Miller, 386 U.S. at 6.
180. Id. at 7.
181. See Michael J. Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy: Expert Testimony Before the Bench,
Tech. Rev., Aug.–Sept. 1987, at 43, 44–45 (“[E]xperts [are] vulnerable to the possibly
distorting influence of lawyers. Long before the expert and lawyers arrive in court, a bond
has formed between them. The influence of the lawyer is considerable.”); John I. Thornton,
Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1983, at 288, 292 (“The evidence will
be selected or rejected with only those items that conform to the arguments of one side
actually being submitted for examination. A distinct possibility exists that the results of the
examination by the forensic scientist will be skewed. . . . These situations represent potential
sources of mischief. . . . The danger is that conflicts easily arise between scientist and
lawyer—the former attempts to describe the evidence as it actually is, while the latter
attempts to describe it in the most favorable light.”).
182. See Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 258 (1988) (stating that “[t]he
District Court further concluded that one of the prosecutors improperly argued with an
expert witness during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave testimony adverse to
the Government”); Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, From the Start, A Faulty Science:
Testimony on Bite Marks Prone to Error, Chi. Trib., Oct. 19, 2004, §1, at 21 (“‘You get
pushed a little bit by prosecutors, and sometimes you say OK to get them to shut up. . . . I
allowed myself to be pushed.’” (quoting a forensic dentist)).
183. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 31 (“Asked later if he was pressured to change his
findings on Coakley, [Dr.] Shaler [the expert] said no. ‘Most attorneys,’ Shaler would also
say, ‘like to let you know what their opinions of the facts of the case are—irrespective of the
scientific conclusions.’”).
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the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the expert’s
opinion on the subject.”184 The commentary to the Standard reads,
“Statements made by physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts about their
experiences as witnesses in criminal cases indicate the need for
circumspection on the part of prosecutors who engage experts.”185
An example of the problem is found in John Grisham’s first nonfiction
book, The Innocent Man, which tells the story of Ron Williamson.186 Five
days before Williamson’s scheduled execution for murder, a federal judge
granted his petition for habeas relief.187 The police had focused on
Williamson and an acquaintance, despite the discovery of an unidentified
bloody palm print at the crime scene. The print matched neither the
suspects nor the victim, a fact that by itself might raise reasonable doubt.
Then the fingerprint examiner inexplicably developed qualms about his
earlier opinion. Consequently, four and a half years after the crime, the
prosecution exhumed the victim’s body, obtained new prints (from a now
decomposing body), and the fingerprint expert changed his opinion, the
“only time in his twenty-four-year career.”188 Now the bloody print
matched the victim’s palm, and the prosecution could proceed against
Williamson,189 who would later be exonerated by DNA.190
Troedel v. Wainwright191 offers another illustration. Defendants David
W. Troedel and David Lee Hawkins were convicted of capital murder in
separate trials. An FBI report of a gunshot residue test using neutron
activation analysis concluded that swabs “from the hands of Troedel and
Hawkins contained antimony and barium [primer components] in amounts
typically found on the hands of a person who has discharged a firearm or
has had his hands in close proximity to a discharging firearm.”192 The
expert, John Riley, testified in accordance with this report at Hawkins’s trial
but enhanced his testimony at Troedel’s trial, where he testified that
“Troedel had fired the murder weapon.”193 State courts upheld Troedel’s
conviction. During federal habeas proceedings, Riley’s deposition was
184. Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 3-3.3(a)
(3d ed. 1993).
185. Id. at cmt. 59. The commentary further adds, “Nothing should be done by a
prosecutor to cast suspicion on the process of justice by suggesting that the expert color an
opinion to favor the interests of the prosecutor.” Id.
186. John Grisham, The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town (2006).
187. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff’d, 110 F.3d
1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
188. Grisham, supra note 186, at 121.
189. The examination of the hair evidence was also suspect. The first examiner found
that the hair samples recovered at the scene were “consistent only with” the victim’s hair.
The case was then transferred to another examiner, who, after twenty-seven months, found
that the crime scene samples were consistent with the defendants’ hair. Id. at 179–80. For a
further discussion of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 210–13.
190. Glen Gore, who testified against Ron Williamson, was later proved to be the actual
killer through DNA evidence. Grisham, supra note 186, at 311, 346.
191. 667 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987).
192. Id. at 1458.
193. Id. at 1459.
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taken, at which time he testified that “he could not, from the results of his
tests, determine or say to a scientific certainty who had fired the murder
weapon” and the “amount of barium and antimony on the hands of Troedel
and Hawkins were basically insignificant.”194
The district court found Riley’s trial testimony “at the very least”
misleading.195 Riley claimed that the prosecutor had “pushed” him further
in Troedel’s trial, a claim the prosecutor substantiated:
. . . [O]ne of the prosecutors testified [at the habeas hearing] that, at
Troedel’s trial, after Mr. Riley had rendered his opinion which was
contained in his written report, the prosecutor pushed to “see if more
could have been gotten out of this witness.” When questioned why, in the
Hawkins trial, he did not use Mr. Riley’s opinion that Troedel had fired
the weapon, the prosecutor responded he did not know why.196

In granting habeas relief, the court found,
In light of this admission, the above testimony received at the
evidentiary hearing and the inconsistent positions taken by the
prosecution at Hawkins’ and Troedel’s trials, respectively, the Court
concludes that the opinion Troedel had fired the weapon was known by
the prosecution not to be based on the results of the neutron activation
analysis tests, or on any scientific certainty or even probability. Thus, the
subject testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the State
knowing it to be misleading.197

C. Withholding Information at Trial
In Driscoll v. Delo,198 a capital murder case, the laboratory report
indicated that blood traces on Robert Driscoll’s knife were type A, which
matched the blood of a prison guard who had been injured by a stab wound
but did not match the blood type of a murdered guard whose blood type was
O.199 To explain the absence of type O blood, the prosecution offered
several theories, one of which was that the presence of the type O blood

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1459–60. The court also found David Troedel’s counsel ineffective. Because
defense counsel knew that the gunshot residue testimony was “critical,” his “failure either to
depose the State’s expert witness or, more importantly, to consult with any other expert in
the field, fell outside the scope of reasonably professional assistance.” Id. at 1461.
198. 71 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 707. The defense counsel was also ineffective:
[Whether the alleged murder weapon] had blood matching the victim’s constituted
an issue of the utmost importance. Under these circumstances, a reasonable
defense lawyer would take some measures to understand the laboratory tests
performed and the inferences that one could logically draw from the results. At
the very least, any reasonable attorney under the circumstances would study the
state’s laboratory report with sufficient care so that if the prosecution advanced a
theory at trial that was at odds with the serology evidence, the defense would be in
a position to expose it on cross-examination.
Id. at 709.
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was “masked” by the type A blood.200 The chief serologist of the state
crime laboratory testified about this theory at trial.201 Only in a subsequent
habeas proceeding was it revealed that the serologist had performed another
procedure (a lattes test) which had eliminated the “masking” problem,
revealing the lack of type O blood.202 “The jury was never informed that
the lattes test was performed or that no type O blood was on the knife. . . .
In its closing argument, the state made much of the masking theory, turning
unfavorable serology evidence into neutral evidence at worst.”203
In the infamous Cruz and Hernandez prosecution, the misuse of scientific
evidence as well as other evidence led a police officer and an assistant
attorney general to resign in protest during the initial proceedings and led to
trials of the original prosecutors and police officers.204 Professor Barry
Scheck and his colleagues explain one instance of misconduct:
When a crime technician arrived at the courthouse to testify for the
state, he pulled aside one of the prosecutors and relayed some news:
representatives from the Nike shoe company said that the prints at the
back window had been made by a woman’s shoe, perhaps size six or five
and a half. Either size was too small for Cruz or Hernandez. The
prosecutor put the technician on the witness stand and carefully avoided
any mention of shoe size or likely gender. In fact, the defense was not
told about the Nike analysis.205

D. Failure to Correct Overstatements
Expert testimony that goes beyond the limitations of a scientific
technique is not unusual.206 It is often difficult to discern, however,
whether the prosecutor is a knowing participant in this context.
Nevertheless, because “competence” is the first ethical obligation of an
attorney and no criminal practitioner should go into court today without
understanding scientific evidence, a claim of ignorance merely shifts the
ethical lapse from one rule to another.

200. Id. at 707.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 708.
203. Id.
204. Connors et al., supra note 15, at 44–46. The case is also discussed supra text
accompanying notes 10–20. Stephen Buckley was the third defendant.
205. Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 178.
206. See State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. 1974) (“We are concerned . . .
about the sweeping and unqualified manner in which [the expert’s] testimony was
offered . . . . An expert witness could be permitted to testify that in his opinion the
chemicals present on defendant’s hand may have resulted from the firing of a gun. He
should not have been permitted to state, as he did, that this defendant had definitely fired a
gun.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis,
59 Cal. L. Rev. 997, 1024 (1971) (“[F]ew experts have used appropriate care in limiting their
testimony . . . .”).
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Hair evidence is illustrative.207 In one case, the expert testified that the
crime scene hair sample “was unlikely to match anyone” other than the
defendant, Edward Honaker.208 This testimony was a gross overstatement.
At best, the expert could have testified that the hairs were consistent, which
means that they could have come from Honaker or thousands of other
people. A competent prosecutor should have known this. Indeed, another
prosecutor would later acknowledge that “[t]here was no question that the
state hair expert [at Honaker’s trial] had overstated the distinctiveness of the
hair recovered from the victim’s shorts in his trial testimony.”209
Similarly, in Williamson v. Reynolds,210 the expert testified at trial that
hair samples were “consistent microscopically”211 and then went on to
explain what this meant: “In other words, hairs are not an absolute
identification, but they either came from this individual or there is—could
be another individual somewhere in the world that would have the same
characteristics to their hair.”212 As John Grisham notes, “There is an
excellent chance that [the hairs] could not have come from the same source,
but such testimony was rarely volunteered, at least on direct
examination.”213 Both Honaker and Williamson were later exonerated by
DNA testing.
In Mitchell v. State,214 Joyce Gilchrist’s testimony implicated the accused
in a sexual assault. She knew, however, that her testimony had been
completely undercut by an exculpatory DNA report, which had been
withheld from the defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
observed that this improper conduct was compounded by “the prosecutor,
whom the district court found had ‘labored extensively at trial to obscure
207. See generally Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Forensic Science: Hair
Comparison Evidence, 37 Crim. L. Bull. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases
in which hair evidence was used to convict the innocent); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick
D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or
Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the
purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they
have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether from
criminal trials.”).
208. Connors et al., supra note 15, at 58.
209. Harland Levy, And the Blood Cried Out: A Prosecutor’s Spellbinding Account of
the Power of DNA 153 (1996).
210. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff’d sub nom., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d
1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 186–90 (discussing
other aspects of the Williamson case).
211. Id. at 1554.
212. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant was later exonerated by exculpatory DNA
evidence, and, as Scheck and his colleagues point out, “The hair evidence was patently
unreliable.” Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 146; see also id. at 134 (“Not until December
1985, three years after the murder, did the state finish its first report on the hair examination.
A trained hair man named Melvin Hett concluded that thirteen hairs found around the
victim’s body appeared to have come from the head and pubis of Dennis Fritz [an alleged
accomplice]. Another four hairs from the murder scene were linked to Ron Williamson. By
itself, though, the hair report was not strong enough to prove capital murder.”).
213. Grisham, supra note 186, at 179.
214. 884 P.2d 1186 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
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the true DNA test results and to highlight [the expert’s] test results,’ and
whose characterization of the FBI report in his closing argument was
‘entirely unsupported by evidence and . . . misleading.’”215
E. Technically Accurate but Misleading Opinions
A more difficult issue arises when the testimony is accurate in a technical
sense and yet misleading. The controversial Sacco and Vanzetti case, in
which the defendants were charged with murder during a payroll robbery in
1921, is illustrative. Many believe their execution resulted more from their
foreign status and “radical” beliefs than from the cogency of the evidence
presented against them. Firearms identification evidence played a critical
role in this prosecution. The firearms identification testimony was
“carelessly assembled, incompletely and confusedly presented,” and was, in
the view of some commentators, “beyond the comprehension” of the
jury.216 After reviewing the case, Professors Edmund M. Morgan and G.
Louis Joughin noted,
On October 23 Captain Proctor made [a posttrial] affidavit indicating that
he had repeatedly told [the prosecutor] that he would have to answer in
the negative if he were asked whether he had found positive evidence that
the fatal bullet had been fired from Sacco’s pistol. The statement which
Proctor made on the witness stand was: “My opinion is that it is
consistent with being fired by that pistol.”217

Although the “consistent with” language is technically correct, it involves a
distinction too subtle for most juries. It is, in effect, misleading, and as the
above passage suggests, intentionally so.
F. Closing Argument
Properly presented evidence may become misleading due to its
characterization in closing argument to the jury. Williamson also
exemplifies this issue. In summation, the prosecutor claimed, “[T]here’s a

215. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). “The results
thus completely undermined Ms. Gilchrist’s testimony.” Id. at 1064. As the court noted,
An expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the DNA testing performed by
Agent Vick unquestionably eliminated Mr. Mitchell . . . . This expert reviewed
Ms. Gilchrist’s trial testimony . . . and stated that the testimony was based on the
use of test methods Ms. Gilchrist knew were less precise than the DNA tests which
eliminated Mr. Mitchell. Moreover, he pointed out that one of the tests she
performed in fact excluded Mr. Mitchell.
Id.; see also Gilchrist v. Okla. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 94 P.3d 72, 75 (Okla. 2004)
(“Gilchrist’s conduct in Mitchell, that is knowingly giving false and misleading testimony in
a criminal case, constituted ‘misconduct’ sufficient to support the denial of unemployment
benefits . . . .”).
216. G. Louis Joughin & Edmund M. Morgan, The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti 15
(1948); see also James E. Starrs, Once More unto the Breech: The Firearms Evidence in the
Sacco and Vanzetti Case Revisited (pts. 1 & 2), 31 J. Forensic Sci. 630 (1986), 31 J. Forensic
Sci. 1050 (1986).
217. Joughin & Morgan, supra note 216, at 15.
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match.”218 Even the state court misinterpreted the evidence, writing that
the “[h]air evidence placed [petitioner] at the decedent’s apartment.”219
Using the term “match”—without further explication—is frequently
confusing.220
Similarly, in People v. Linscott221 the Illinois Supreme Court found that
the prosecutor improperly argued that hairs collected from the victim’s
apartment “were conclusively identified as coming from defendant’s head
and pubic region. There simply was no testimony at trial to support these
statements. In fact, [the prosecution experts] and the defense hair expert . . .
testified that no such identification was possible.”222 Steven Paul Linscott
was also subsequently exonerated by DNA evidence.223
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND REFORMS
In the preceding sections, we made some specific recommendations
regarding particular problems such as late and incomplete disclosure and
inadequate or nonexistent lab reports. Here we offer some observations and
suggestions that apply broadly to all of the problems discussed above.
A. Effective Representation of the Public
DNA exonerations have revealed that defense counsel in criminal cases
involving scientific evidence often did not provide their clients with
effective representation. Perhaps because the prosecutor’s client is the
government rather than an individual, we often fail to appreciate that the
prosecutors in these cases also seriously fail in their ethical obligations to
represent the government effectively. Through the conviction of innocent
persons, the consequent failure to convict the actual perpetrators, and the
creation of cynicism toward the criminal justice system, prosecutors who
misuse scientific evidence fail to serve the interests of the governments they
represent as well as the public interest, and thus fail in their ethical
obligations.

218. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1557 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (alteration in
original).
219. Id. (emphasis omitted).
220. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 36 (discussing misuse of the term “match” in the
Central Park jogger case).
221. 566 N.E.2d 1355 (Ill. 1991).
222. Id. at 1359.
223. Connors et al., supra note 15, at 65 (“The State’s expert on the hair examination
testified that only 1 in 4,500 persons would have consistent hairs when tested for 40 different
characteristics. He only tested between 8 and 12 characteristics, however, and could not
remember which ones. The appellate court ruled on July 29, 1987, that this testimony,
coupled with the prosecution’s use of it at closing argument, constituted denial of a fair
trial.” (citation omitted)).
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B. Need to Investigate Prosecutors’ Role
The frequency and seriousness of prosecutorial misuse of scientific
evidence suggest something is seriously wrong, not only with the experts
who provide this evidence but also with the prosecutors who call those
experts into criminal courtrooms. Particularly troubling is the fact that
some prosecutors have repeatedly used experts such as Fred Zain and Joyce
Gilchrist, despite obvious warning signs of corruption.
Why have prosecutors engaged in such behavior? Why have they failed
to detect or act to correct defective scientific evidence?224 One plausible
answer is that prosecutors act this way simply because these experts,
corrupt or not, help win convictions. Certainly obtaining convictions is a
powerful incentive for prosecutors. But an explanation that focuses solely
on the incentive to win a case seems unduly simplistic, failing to account
for the complexity of the constellation of incentives operating on a
prosecutor and the psychological dynamics of the prosecutor’s role.
Prosecutors are subject to a number of incentives to avoid the use of corrupt
scientific evidence, such as the desire not to convict the innocent and the
desire to convict the guilty. Self-interest also provides an incentive not to
use corrupt evidence in order to avoid public embarrassment, damage to
career, and implication in obstruction of justice.
One possible explanation for prosecutorial use of junk scientific evidence
is that prosecutors are simply not skilled enough in this area to provide a
check on tainted experts. But if, as noted above, pressure from prosecutors
is a significant contributing cause of the introduction of corrupt scientific
evidence, then something more malign than simple incompetence is at play
in some cases. Another possible explanation is that the psychological
phenomenon of escalation of commitment may blind prosecutors to the
possibility of a defendant’s innocence or an expert witness’s falsity.
Many prosecutors undoubtedly adhere to their legal and ethical
obligations regarding the selection, discovery, and presentation of expert
witnesses and, in doing so, help protect our criminal justice system from
perverse scientific evidence. But a disturbingly high number of cases reveal
prosecutors who fail to adhere to these obligations. Unfortunately, we do
not have much information about what percentage of prosecutors fall into
this latter category. Nor do we have good information about what is driving
this misconduct when it occurs. As Professor Bennett L. Gershman
commented,

224. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 399, 400
(“[P]rosecutorial misconduct is largely the result of three institutional conditions: vague
ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary authority
with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, which
create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from,
prosecutorial misconduct.”).
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The prosecutor’s misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict
has not been sufficiently examined. Courts and commentators critiquing
abuses of scientific evidence in criminal cases rarely focus on the
prosecutor’s role in the process. Issues typically discussed are the
questionable nature of the evidence, the controversial manner in which the
evidence was acquired and tested, whether the expert arrived at her
conclusions in a scientifically reliable manner, and whether the expert’s
courtroom testimony was false or misleading. The prosecutor’s control
over and manipulation of the scientific evidence to shape the fact-finder’s
evaluation of the facts and to persuade the fact-finder of the defendant’s
guilt usually escapes scrutiny.225

Investigation into prosecutorial involvement in the misuse of scientific
evidence is an important step toward understanding and correcting such
conduct.
C. Competence
Perhaps the most basic of professional ethical obligations is competence.
Indeed, it appears as the first of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”226
An
accompanying comment explains that relevant factors in determining
whether a lawyer acts competently include “the relative complexity and
specialized nature of the matter.”227
As its text indicates, questions of competence under Model Rule 1.1 can
be broken down into issues of expertise and preparation. The first—which
the Rule refers to with the words “knowledge” and “skill”—deals with the
capability of a lawyer to handle a particular representation. The second—
which the Rule refers to with the words “thoroughness and preparation”—
deals with the time and effort the lawyer invests in preparing the case. In
other words, a lawyer may violate the duty of competence by lacking
sufficient knowledge of or skill in a particular field, such as patent, tax, or
divorce law. Or, even if he has sufficient expertise, he may violate the duty
of competence by failing to investigate and prepare the case sufficiently by,
for example, failing to obtain sufficient information from the client, to
interview witnesses, or to review documents provided in discovery.
No attorney can competently try criminal cases today without a
grounding in scientific evidence. The ABA recently adopted the following
recommendations: (1) “Training in forensic science for attorneys should be
made available at minimal cost to ensure adequate representation for both
the public and defendants,” and (2) “Counsel should have competence in
the relevant area or consult with those who do where forensic evidence is

225. Gershman, supra note 5, at 17 (emphasis added).
226. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2007).
227. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 1.
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essential in a case.”228 Familiarity with scientific evidence could be made
part of the basic training for all new prosecutors. Or a prosecutor’s office
could train certain prosecutors in scientific evidence and assign them to
cases involving experts or have them handle expert witnesses as part of a
trial team.
D. Prosecutors in an Adversary System
Our criminal justice system employs a series of measures aimed at
controlling the quality of evidence used to support a conviction. The
quality control device most frequently highlighted in our adversary system
is opposing counsel.229 Defense counsel’s role is to challenge and to reveal
the weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence through cross-examination,
presentation of counterproof, and drawing the fact-finder’s attention to the
weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence in closing argument. As the
Supreme Court has noted, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.”230
Yet there is little question that defense counsel have often failed in
controlling the quality of scientific proof,231 and the ABA recommendations
cited in the previous section apply to defense attorneys as well as to
prosecutors. In addition, we have advocated comprehensive pretrial
discovery in prior parts of this essay, recommendations that would go a
long way in promoting effective representation.232 Moreover, a number of

228. Achieving Justice, supra note 169, at 47.
229. Another quality control mechanism is the fact-finder—either judge or jury—who is
trusted with ultimate responsibility for sorting out what is false and what is true, using
judgment and reasoning to assess what has been presented by the lawyers. In a criminal
case, the adversary system also relies on a high standard of proof—beyond reasonable
doubt—as a quality control measure regarding prosecution evidence.
230. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (citing Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
231. See Scheck et al., supra note 2, at 246. Twenty-seven percent of the cases involved
incompetent counsel. Id.; e.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209–11 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding
ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of a capital murder case due to counsel’s failure to
present evidence of defendant’s mental retardation/neurological impairment, counsel’s
acquiescence to prosecutor’s suggestion that the experts requested by defense be treated as
court-appointed rather than defense experts, and counsel’s failure to challenge expert
reports); Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726–27 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding a failure to pursue
an impotency defense in a rape case); United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1418 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding that a failure to consult handwriting expert made out a viable claim of
ineffectiveness); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding a failure to
have a quilt examined for gunshot residue).
232. “It is also clear that in case after case, defense counsel failed to review the case notes
of the prosecution’s forensic serologists. Even a layperson would have seen that Fred Zain’s
written reports and sworn testimony were contradicted by his case notes.” Walter F. Rowe,
Commentary, in Connors et al., supra note 15, at xv, xviii.
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studies have demonstrated the recurrent failure to provide independent
experts to the defense.233 This needs to be rectified.
1. Judge as Gatekeeper
Both scholars and practitioners have expressed concern in recent years
that the adversary system’s quality control mechanisms are insufficient to
assure the reliability of scientific evidence. One response to this concern
has been the recognition of a “gatekeeping” role for trial judges. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.234 has been transformed from a case
that most courts and commentators believed lowered the barriers to the
admissibility of scientific evidence to one that the Court now describes as
imposing an “exacting” standard.235 As gatekeepers, judges are charged
with screening out scientific evidence deemed unreliable because of
insufficient data, unsound scientific principles, or unsound application of
sound principles.236 The trial judge’s gatekeeping responsibility, it should
be noted, supplements rather than replaces traditional adversarial quality
control mechanisms such as cross-examination, counterproof, the factfinder’s judgment, and the standard of proof.
However, the demanding standards of Daubert have yet to be fully
implemented in criminal litigation.237 Courts, for example, continue to
233. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305 (2004) (discussing the need to
bolster the accused’s right to defense experts).
234. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court followed with General Electric Company v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to form what
is now known as the Daubert trilogy.
235. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
236. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Indeed, some federal courts have read the Daubert trilogy as
inviting a “reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical fields.” United
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (discussing handwriting comparison);
see also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002). The court
noted, “Courts are now confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility
had long been settled.” Id. The court also noted that handwriting comparison is a wellsettled field that is now being reexamined. Id. As a result, attacks have been launched
against handwriting evidence, hair comparisons, fingerprint examinations, firearms
identification, bite mark analysis, and intoxication testing. While most of these challenges
have been unsuccessful in terms of admissibility, they have exposed the lack of empirical
support for many commonly employed forensic techniques.
237. One commentator noted that “the heightened standards of dependability imposed on
expertise proffered in civil cases has continued to expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the
prosecution in criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in pre-Daubert
standards or approach.” D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99, 149 (2000). An
extensive study of the reported criminal cases found that “the Daubert decision did not
impact on the admission rates of expert testimony at either the trial or the appellate court
levels.” Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 339, 364
(2002). In contrast, a Rand Institute study of civil cases concluded that, “since Daubert,
judges have examined the reliability of expert evidence more closely and have found more
evidence unreliable as a result.” Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision 25 (2001).
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admit comparative hair analysis.238 Consequently, one might question
whether either the adversary system or the judiciary will adequately protect
against the use of junk science by prosecutors.
2. The Prosecutor as Gatekeeper
In this section, we suggest the recognition of a gatekeeping role for
prosecutors when offering scientific evidence. A possible mechanism for
implementing such a role would be to modify Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.8, which governs the special responsibilities of the prosecutor.
In sum, we suggest adding a provision that would make it an ethics
violation for a prosecutor to knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offer
defective scientific evidence.
A different rule, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) (candor toward the tribunal) is
currently the key ethics provision in all the contexts we discuss above—
selecting, preparing, and presenting expert testimony. It provides,
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . .
(3)

offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the
lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary,
disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to
offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant
in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false.239

Before turning to a gatekeeping role for prosecutors regarding corrupt
scientific evidence, it is worth noting a few salient features of this Model
Rule. First, it applies the same standard to prosecutors as it does to civil
litigators and criminal defense lawyers. In contrast, Model Rule 3.8
articulates the distinct obligations of prosecutors. But it does not address
presentation of false evidence, by default leaving prosecutors covered by
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3).
Second, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) places a minimal obligation on
prosecutors. The prosecutor may introduce evidence unless she knows that
it is false. If the prosecutor suspects that evidence is false or even is aware
of a substantial risk that the evidence is false, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) permits
the prosecutor to introduce the evidence. In other words, using Model
238. See, e.g., State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997) (“Because the scientific
principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established and of
proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as ‘technical knowledge.’
Thus, an independent reliability determination was unnecessary.”); McGrew v. State, 682
N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (concluding that hair comparison is more a matter of
observation by persons with specialized knowledge than a matter of scientific principles);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ky. 1999) (noting that evidence of hair
analysis by microscopic comparison has been admissible in that jurisdiction for many years).
239. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007) (emphasis added).
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Penal Code terminology, the prosecutor may introduce evidence if the
prosecutor’s mental state regarding its falsity is one of innocence,
negligence, or even recklessness.240 Only when the prosecutor’s mental
state is “knowledge” does Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) impose a gatekeeping
function and require the prosecutor not to offer the evidence. A troubling
aspect of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)’s use of knowledge as the triggering
criterion is that it creates an incentive to avoid such knowledge in order to
avoid the prohibition against offering false evidence.241 An interesting
question is whether or not willful blindness on the part of a prosecutor
constitutes knowledge under Model Rule 3.3 as it does in many criminal
codes.242
Why does an ethics rule condone a lawyer offering evidence when he or
she is aware or should be aware of a serious risk that the evidence is false?
The answer is that Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) reflects an adversarial paradigm
that assigns the task of quality control primarily to opposing counsel and
the fact-finder rather than the lawyer offering the evidence. Like many of
our legal ethics rules, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) is a mixed or blended rule,
having both adversarial and cooperative aspects. When the prosecutor has
knowledge of falsity, she must act cooperatively and not introduce false
evidence. But when the prosecutor has a mental state less than knowledge,
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) reflects an adversarial conception of the prosecutor’s
role regarding false evidence.243
240. Model Penal Code § 2.02 (2001). The Model Penal Code created four precisely
defined mental states: (1) purpose, (2) knowledge, (3) recklessness, and (4) negligence.
Recklessness has a subjective component, requiring awareness of the risk. See Joshua
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 10.07 (3d ed. 2001).
241. “If the attorney is prohibited only from offering false expertise when she knows it to
be false, then ignorance is bliss for both the proffered expert and the attorney.” Saks, supra
note 5, at 427.
242. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 27 (“The well-known criminal law doctrine known
as ‘willful blindness’ should apply equally to a prosecutor who regularly uses a scientific
expert who is notorious for incompetence and dishonesty.”).
243. Federal Rule of Evidence 601, dealing with the competence of witnesses, provides a
useful comparison to Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) in terms of both favoring admissibility and
reliance on the adversary system. The common law prevented witnesses from testifying on
bases such as a witness’s conviction of a crime and being a party to the litigation. The
thinking behind these exclusions was that a witness’s bad character and bias threaten the
reliability of a witness’s testimony. The modern approach reflected by the Federal Rules of
Evidence does away entirely with these competence bans despite the fact that the Federal
Rules still view character and bias as highly relevant to the assessment of witness credibility.
Why, one might ask, does the modern view allow a biased witness or one with a prior
perjury conviction to testify? The response is not that the Federal Rules deny that character
and bias raise reliability issues. Rather, the idea here is that the task of monitoring witness
reliability should be handled not by the judge as a gatekeeper enforcing categorical
competence bans, but by opposing counsel wielding the tools of cross-examination and
counterproof in addition to the fact-finder employing its judgment, its reasoning ability, and
the standard of proof. In other words, Rule 601, when compared to the common law of
evidence that preceded it, reveals a shift of power and responsibility away from the judge as
gatekeeper and toward opposing counsel and the fact-finder as primary monitors of witness
reliability. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) reflects similar reasoning regarding lawyers as gatekeepers
of evidence.
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What supports our proposal of creating a greater gatekeeping role for
prosecutors regarding scientific evidence than the one reflected in Model
Rule 3.3(a)(3)? Our primary argument is that such a role is appropriate for
prosecutors because the quality control mechanisms of the adversary system
simply are not working in regard to scientific evidence due to lack of
defense resources. Thus, the minimal obligation set forth in Model Rule
3.3(a)(3) needs to be heightened. Moreover, the cooperative role of
gatekeeper is consistent with and required by the distinct role and
responsibilities of a prosecutor.
Criminal defendants and their lawyers routinely lack the resources to
effectively cross-examine a prosecution expert, to present competing
scientific counterproof, or to point out weaknesses in that expert’s
testimony to the fact-finder in closing argument. The lack of an effective
challenge by opposing counsel has the practical impact of nullifying the
fact-finder’s ability to distinguish corrupt from valid scientific evidence.
Close examination of criminal cases has revealed what is often in effect an
ex parte presentation of scientific evidence by the prosecution. The
defendant and defense counsel are physically present during the
presentation of the evidence, but cannot participate in anything other than a
pro forma fashion due to lack of access to the scientific expertise necessary
for cross-examination, presentation of counterproof, and addressing
evidentiary weaknesses in closing argument.
Investigation of the misuse of scientific evidence, sparked largely by the
advent of DNA evidence, has revealed not only that the defense lawyer’s
and fact-finder’s ability to monitor the quality of scientific evidence has
been seriously compromised, but also that the lack of adversarial challenge
has had a corrupting influence on the experts themselves. How could an
expert such as Fred Zain repeatedly falsify serology tests if there was
effective cross-examination and counterproof from the defense? How
would he muster the audacity to repeatedly falsify evidence if he was not
confident that the supposedly adversarial criminal justice system in which
he operated presented no realistic threat that his falsification would be
revealed?
Lawyer ethics rules uniformly recognize a cooperative standard when a
lawyer makes an ex parte presentation to a fact-finder because the quality
control mechanisms of the adversary system are lacking. Model Rule
3.3(d), for example, requires that a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding present
all material information to the fact-finder, not just what is favorable to his
client as the adversary system would dictate. Comment 14 to Model Rule
3.3 states the obvious reasoning behind this cooperative standard: “[T]here
is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates.”244 Thus, the lawyer
must reveal all facts he “reasonably believes are necessary to [support] an
informed decision.”245
244. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 cmt. 14 (2007).
245. Id.
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This cooperative ex parte standard often applies to prosecutors. For
example, it requires a prosecutor applying for a search warrant or a court
order authorizing a wiretap to make a complete and candid presentation of
the facts. The judge in an ex parte context also has an obligation to act
differently than she would in a setting in which both parties participate. As
pointed out above, although the presentation of scientific evidence takes
place in a setting that appears adversarial, in reality it functions as an ex
parte presentation to the fact-finder.
How might such a cooperative standard be created? One possibility
would be to add a new subsection to Model Rule 3.8 to recognize a
gatekeeper role for prosecutors regarding scientific evidence that would
state, “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: . . . (g) refrain from
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offering false scientific evidence.”
Instead of allowing the presentation of scientific evidence unless the
prosecutor knows it is false, as current Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) does, our
proposal would bar a prosecutor from offering scientific evidence unless
she knows it is sound. This would create an affirmative obligation on the
part of the prosecutor to take reasonable steps to assure the soundness of the
scientific evidence she offers.246 Such an obligation is consistent with the
ethical duty of competence, since a negligent prosecutor is not acting
competently. Alternatively, a rule could be cast as imposing on the
prosecutor a duty to assure that she has a good faith and reasonable basis
for believing in the soundness of scientific evidence she offers, analogous
to the duty to refrain from filing charges without probable cause or the civil
litigator’s obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.247 Such a
rule could be phrased as follows:
246. Professor Jane Campbell Moriarty has recently proposed amending Model Rule 3.8
to prohibit the use of unreliable evidence: “The Prosecutor in a criminal case shall: make
reasonable efforts to assure that only reliable expert evidence is admitted into evidence. A
prosecutor shall not use evidence that she knows or reasonably should know is unreliable.”
Moriarty, supra note 5, at 28. She names hair evidence as a type of evidence that would be
targeted by this proposal. Id. at 29. Professor Michael J. Saks cites handwriting. Saks, supra
note 5, at 428. The weak scientific bases of hair analysis and some other forensic techniques
have concealed expert misconduct in many cases. Yet, as long as courts admit these types of
evidence—the overwhelming majority do—what is or is not reliable is subject to debate. It
would be difficult to fault a prosecutor who used such evidence carefully—that is, ensuring
that the jury understood its limitations. The argument over hair evidence may be academic,
because mitochondrial DNA will probably replace it as the method of choice. See Max M.
Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair
Comparisons, 47 J. Forensic Sci. 964, 966 (2002) (“Of the 80 hairs that were
microscopically associated, nine comparisons were excluded by mtDNA analysis.”); see also
Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech Evidence by
Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1453, 1472 (2007)
(“Although it has become widely available only in the last few years, mtDNA analysis has
nonetheless proven an effective and highly reliable technique to definitively exclude (or
include) an individual as the person who deposited one or more hairs at a crime scene.”
(footnotes omitted)).
247. Another analogous requirement is the one imposed on lawyers during crossexamination of a good faith basis for asking an impeaching question that implies the
existence of an impeaching fact. See, e.g., Ohio R. Evid. 607(B) (“A questioner must have a
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A prosecutor shall not offer scientific evidence unless she has a good faith
and reasonable belief that the evidence (1) is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) is the
product of reliable application of such principles and methods to the facts
of the case.248

CONCLUSION
This essay examines a number of recurring problems associated with the
prosecution’s use of experts: selection of experts, compliance with
discovery obligations, and presentation of testimony at trial. Each presents
different issues. As for pretrial disclosure, amending discovery rules to
require full disclosure of expert testimony, including documentation for
each test and specifying the content of laboratory reports, would obviate
most problems. Imposing discovery sanctions for late disclosure would
also help.
Full discovery would also reduce, though not eliminate, problems with
the presentation of expert testimony. Requiring laboratory reports to
specify the limitations of the technique and including a statement to the jury
explaining the significance of the findings would aid defense counsel and
judges as well as the jury. The selection of experts presents a far more
difficult issue. Yet prosecutors cannot be given a free pass. There should
be both a due process and an ethical obligation on prosecutors to scrutinize
“controversial” experts more thoroughly than some currently do.
Given the special responsibilities of prosecutors as ministers of justice
and the lack of defense access to expert resources, we propose a
gatekeeping role for prosecutors regarding scientific evidence. In sum, we
suggest adding a provision to Model Rule 3.8 that would make it an ethics

reasonable basis for asking any question pertaining to impeachment that implies the
existence of an impeaching fact.”).
248. One way to qualify a gatekeeping obligation for the prosecutor might be to
distinguish among the various categories found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 702
essentially codifies the Daubert and Kumho cases and recognizes the trial judge’s role as a
gatekeeper regarding scientific evidence. Rule 702 recognizes three distinct prerequisites for
admission of scientific evidence for the trial judge to monitor: (1) sufficiency of data, (2)
reliability of principles and methods, and (3) reliable application to facts. Some
commentators have argued that recognizing a gatekeeping role for lawyers would be too
onerous since the principles and methods of science are often uncertain and in a state of flux.
To address this problem, a new ethics rule for prosecutors might distinguish among the
various categories recognized by Rule 702, imposing a more demanding affirmative duty
regarding categories (1) and (3) and a less demanding duty regarding category (2). In a case
involving serology, for example, the prosecutor would need to satisfy herself that the expert
had in fact performed the tests he claims to have conducted and performed them in a way
that minimizes the risk of corruption, such as blind testing. The prosecutor might satisfy this
obligation in a number of ways. The prosecutor’s office might insist on periodic auditing by
outside experts and other measures aimed at reducing the risk of corruption. The prosecutor
could also refrain from offering evidence provided by experts whose work has been revealed
as lacking in reliability in earlier cases or when other circumstantial evidence raises a
question of reliability.
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violation for a prosecutor to knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offer
defective scientific evidence.

